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ABSTRACT
Financial markets have an important relationship with the economic development of a 
country. Developed countries are those who already have arrived to an economic stability 
and can obtain profits, while developing countries are those who are trying to achieve this 
economics stability, most of the times, by adapting its policies to the ones developed 
countries have. This is what Mauro F. Guillén explains and studies in one of its recent 
papers. He has investigated how state capacity (the administrative capacity and ability that a 
country has to formulate and implement policies) affects the institutional adoption of new 
policies.  
In this paper what we will try to study is if the degree of protection investors have in a country 
is related with the level of development of that country. For doing that, we will compare data 
collected from Rafael La Porta, and we will analyze the criticisms and comments done to its 
work by Randall K. Morck and Mauro F. Guillén.  
Besides, we will see the differences that exist in investor protection internationally and we will 
analyze why these differences arise. In order to do so, we will use data collected from the 
World Bank and we will state the differences that make the rank of one country better than 
the other.  
Furthermore we will understand the structure that exists behind the investor protection in 
Spain. What are the main institutions and entities that are in charge to apply regulations and 
laws regarding this investor protection. We will see if there is any difference about protection 
inside Spain, among the four different stock markets.  
Finally we will explain briefly what are the guarantee funds and investor associations, very 
related with investor protection. And we will focus on insider trading when talking about one 
of the most important cases of bankruptcy in the US, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. The 
fourth-largest U.S. investment bank, initiated the largest bankruptcy proceeding in the U.S 
history in 2008.  
RESUMEN
Los mercados financieros han tenido, y tienen, una relación importante con el desarrollo 
económico. Los países desarrollados son aquellos que ya gozan de una relativa estabilidad 
económica y por lo tanto pueden centrarse en obtener beneficios. Por otra parte, los países 
en desarrollo son los que están tratando de llegar a dicha estabilidad económica, y para ello, 
la mayor parte de las veces, adoptan las medidas utilizadas por los países desarrollados. 
Esto es lo que trata de explicar Mauro F. Guillén en uno de sus recientes estudios que más 
adelante mencionaremos. El autor, ha investigado cómo la capacidad del Estado (es decir, la 
capacidad administrativa y la flexibilidad que un país tiene para formular y desarrollar 
nuevas medidas políticas) afecta a la adopción de nuevas medidas políticas 
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En este trabajo vamos a tratar de estudiar si el grado de protección del inversor de un país 
está relacionado con el nivel de desarrollo de ese país. Para ello, vamos a comparar los 
datos obtenidos por diversos autores. Entre ellos, Rafael La Porta, el cual ha escrito varias 
veces sobre el tema. Además, analizaremos las críticas y observaciones hechas a su labor 
por Randall K. Morck y Mauro F. Guillén. 
También veremos las diferencias que existen en la protección del inversor en el contexto 
international y analizaremos por qué surgen estas diferencias. Con el fin de hacerlo, vamos 
a utilizar los datos recogidos for el Banco Mundial (World Bank) y indicaremos las diferencias 
que hacen que unos países se encuentren más arriba en el ranking que otros.  
Además, vamos a entender la estructura que existe detrás de la protección del inversor en 
España. Cuáles son las principales instituciones y entidades que se encargan de aplicar los 
reglamentos y leyes relacionadas con el tema. Veremos si hay alguna diferencia acerca de 
la protección dentro de España, entre las cuatro bolsas de valores que existen.  
Por último, vamos a explicar brevemente lo que son los fondos de garantía y las 
asociaciones de inversores, ambos muy relacionados con la protección del inversor. Nos 
centraremos en el tema del abuso de la información, y la información privilegiada mientras 
analizamos uno de los casos más importante de quiebra en los EE.UU, Lehman Brothers 
Holdings, Inc. El cuarto mayor banco de inversión de los EE.UU, el cual inició el proceso de 
quiebra más importante de la historia de U.S en 2008.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Investor protection is normally defined by the extent to which the commercial laws of each 
country and its enforcement protect investors from the possibility of expropriation by 
company insiders. Investor protection turns out to be crucial because, in many countries this 
expropriation of minority shareholders and creditors will lead to a situation of 
unreliability.There are many people who think that is better for countries to concern in 
investor protection, since by improving the systems that protect investors, the impact on 
firm’s ability to raise external financing will have a positive effect.  
Not only investors and creditors are the ones who think that the system will be better off by 
improving its protection, also the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development support this view. There are 
many papers published by the Wold Bank and the International Monetary Fund regarding this 
topic and in all of them we can see its concern about the improvement of investor protection. 
More precisely we can even say that, the first paper published in “Financial sector Discussion 
Papers” by the World Bank in September 1999 was regarding this topic . Furthermore, we 1
can find more recent articles regarding this topic, like the one published in 2014 in which it 
suggested investor protector as the key for attracting private capital development .  2
All this information brings us to what Randall K. Morck published in November 2005 (Figure 
1).This author has a lot of papers regarding our topic, he analyzed how the degree of 
investor protector in some countries, such as: Germany, India, Italy, China, Canada among 
others, affects the ongoing economy of the country, the corporate ownership and the financial 
control. Furthermore, we can see in many of its papers the idea that common-law systems 
protect often the weak from the strong even in the absence of explicit statutes. We can 
subtract from here that states and financial institutions will always protect the weak minority 
shareholder rather than the big one, but is this true? Or we are in the case that powerful 
individuals, the big ones, the ones who control the financial market, are the ones who also 
control the policing powers of the state?  
Morck also studied deeply the analysis made by Rafael La Porta during the 1990s (La Porta ,
1999. In one of its fundamental papers, La Porta argued that stock market development 
should be positively correlated with shareholder legal protection. So, the more protected are 
shareholders, the more improvement we will find in market development. This has totally 
common sense. Once shareholders, investors and creditors feel safety, there will be more 
prone to invest and to take risks, and this will increase profits and benefits in the country.  La 
Porta finds that countries with stronger shareholder protection were characterized by larger 
stock markets and more large corporations, and the most important, these countries tend to 
have legal systems derived from British common law.  
 Porta, R. La, Lopez-de-silanes, F., Porta, R. La, & Lopez-de-silanes, F. (1999) “Investor Protection : Origins , 1
Consequences , Reform Investor Protection : Origins , Consequences”, Journal of Financial Economics, 
forthcoming. pp.1-41.
 Profitable Opportunities and Investor Protection Key for Attracting Private Capital for Railway Development, 2
August 28, 2914
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But, why these countries decided to adopt the systems derived from the common British law? 
We can find the answer in one recent paper published by Mauro F. Guillén and Laurence 
Capron . In this paper what these two authors want to test, is how state capacity  affects the 3 4
institutional adoption of new policies by countries, and what happens if these new policies 
are related with the protection of minority shareholders.  
Units the 1970s, the Anglo-Saxon countries were the only ones who have decided to adopt a 
legal framework highly protective with the rights its minority shareholders. The key features of 
current U.K were very good. There was a substantial institutional shareholdings, a hostile 
takeover market and an extensively minority investor protection. Meanwhile, continental 
European, East Asian, and Latin American countries were evolving in a different way. The 
models that prevailed in such countries were often emphasizing the roles of large controlling 
shareholders, banks, and employees (as we can see totally opposite with Anglo-Saxon 
countries).  
In the early 1980s, the global map of shareholder protection began to change. The causes of 
this change were basically the spread of legal protections over the following three decades. 
There were many policies implemented, market reforms, regulations and deregulations. We 
can set as a shuttle of this change the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 . As Mauro 5
F. Guillén states in its paperwork, the thoughts during this period were focused only to help 
companies to raise capital. If investor feel secure and protected, they will invest in 
companies, and thus these companies will increase its capital.  
The global financial crisis suffered in 2008 gave a new prospective to investor protection. The 
worldwide adoption of minority shareholder protections is more than historical interest, is 
nowadays present in our lives. The crisis made some countries deal with corporate scandals 
and lost shareholders wealth affecting not just rich households but also pensioners and small 
investors. One of the most relevant cases was starred by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 
the fourth-largest U.S. investment bank who initiated the largest bankruptcy proceeding in 
the U.S history. Could we prevent this failure? Could we have minimize the damages 
suffered by minority investors? 
This situation is not new for ourselves. The historians have found a very similar situation in 
1929, when the famous “carck of 29” ruined lots of minority investors and savers who put its 
savings into the stock market. So, what were the changes applied in 1929 that made 
 Guillén, Mauro F., and Laurence Capron. 2015. “State Capacity, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Stock 3
Market Development.” Johnson University, Administrative Science Quarterly March 2016, vol. 61 no. 1 pp. 
125-160
 “State capacity can be broadly defined as the administrative and organizational ability of the state to identify, 4
evaluate, formulate, and implement policies” ,  Guillén, Mauro F., and Laurence Capron. 2015. “State Capacity, 4
Minority Shareholder Protections, and Stock Market Development.” Johnson University, Administrative Science 
Quarterly March 2016, vol. 61 no. 1 125-160, . This lead us to think that the more equipped a state is, the more 
easily and quickly it will be able to improve or implement new policies. 
 Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC),which is an independent, government-sponsored membership 5
corporation to which all persons registered as broker-dealers under the 1934 Act must belong. SIPC insurance 
provides protection for customers' cash and securities in the event of a broker-dealer bankruptcy
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possible to avoid another crisis until 2008? Why did this crisis happen? We can find the 
answer if we go back until the application of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1934. This regulation 
minimized the risks for investors, but at the time it was abolished in 1999, problems began to 
start.  
In this paperwork we will analyze the mechanisms and regulations that States and financial 
institutions have adopted since the Glass-Steagall Act in order to protect minority investors 
and we will suggest the possibility of implementing again this regulation. We will see what are 
the main international differences in investor protection in countries such as : Spain, UK, US 
and France. In order to make this analysis, we will be focused fundamentally in those 
institutions placed in Spain, and we will compare them with other countries, in order to see if 
there any difference among them. In this way, we will study the origins of the PIM (Protección 
Inversor Minorista), the  Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and the figure of 
Investor Protector. Furthermore, we will discuss topics regarding the function of guarantee 
funds and investor associations in Spain in order to compare its performance with the one 
done by official financial institutions.  
2. METHODOLOGY
This study was carried out in order to see and clarify how minority investors are protected 
around the world, and more deeply the efficiency and the functions done by the figure of the 
Investor Protector in Spain. To be able to gather all the necessary data, we have used the 
descriptive method, using quantitative data (information collected from Internet, books, 
papers, thesis, history and economic magazines). Relevant secondary literatures were also 
used to support all the findings.  
The credibility and reliability of findings and conclusions depend basically on the quality of 
the research design, the data collection and the most important one, the data analysis. In this 
chapter we will take a look to the description of the methods and procedures done in order to 
obtain all the data, how we have interpreted that, and how we have arrived to our final 
conclusion.  
2.1.Research Methods 
To carry out this study we have utilized the comparative historical method of research. With 
this method we have examined some of the historical events that concern our subject 
(investor protection) in order to arrive to a final conclusion and valid explanations in a 
particular time and place. So, were focused on the Investor Protector. The dates and time in 
which we are focused are different; when talking about the Investor Protector in Spain, the 
topic is introduced by a conflict that is already alive with Bankia; when we talk about the 
world wide investor protection, we have been focused in the most important countries. At the 
end of the project, we have tried to make some suggestions of how to improve this situation 
by comparing the situation lived during the Glass Steagall Act and nowadays.  
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We have tried to use two types of sources: primary and secondary sources. The first ones 
derives from the answers of people significantly involved in the topic of this study. We have 
tried to talk with the different institutions regarding the investor protection in Spain, but we 
have not succeeded since the majority of them (except Barcelona) are outside Barcelona, 
and they did not want telephone conversations. The Bolsa de Barcelona did not answer our 
emails in order to have a meeting with Joan Hortala (current president of the institution).  
The secondary sources on the other hand, were derived from the findings stated in published 
documents and literature related to our topic, some of them recommended by the Investor 
Protectors in Spain and others by the Grupo BME, as explained below.  
A chronological list of the contacts established to obtain information follows below:  
18 February 2016 - Email to the Borsa de Barcelona, asking for information related to the 
topic of the investor protection and the regulations of the “Borsa de Barcelona” since its 
creation. No answer by the institution.  
23 February 2016 - Email to the Grupo BME asking for information regarding the topic of 
regulations in the different stock markets of Spain. Answer from the Library department, 
M.Paz Alonso Pardo (26 February 2016), with a huge list of books, papers, magazine and 
official regulations regarding the topic.  
2 March 2016 - Telephone call to the “Borsa de Barcelona”, asking for some information of 
the schedules of visit of the library, and asking for the possibility to contact with Joan Hortalà 
(actual president of the institution). No further answer.  
14 March 2016 - Email to the Investor Protector of Madrid, asking for information related to 
the topic of the investor protection and the regulations regarding this topic since its creation. 
Answer from the department of the Investor Protection (17 March 2016), telling the year of 
creation and the regulations that concern the topic.  
14 March 2016 - Email to the department of advice and help to investors of the Borsa de 
Barcelona, asking for information related to the topic of the investor protection and the 
regulations of this figure since its creation. No answer by the institution.  
14 March 2016 - Email to the department of advice and help to investors of the Bolsa de 
Bilbao, asking for information related to the topic of the investor protection and the 
regulations of this figure since its creation. No answer by the institution.  
14 March 2016 - Email to the department of advice and help to investors of the Bolsa de 
Valencia, asking for information related to the topic of the investor protection and the 
regulations of this figure since its creation. No answer by the institution.  
14 March 2016 - Email to the department of advice and help to investors of the Grupo BME, 
asking for information related to the topic of the investor protection and the regulations of this 
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figure since its creation. Answer from Teresa Estruch (21 March 2016), she will look for 
information and sell it.  
14 March 2016 - Direct email to actual Investor Protector of the Bolsa de Valencia (found its 
email in Internet), asking for information regrind the topic. Answer from Carlos Ochoa (15 
March 2016), he will look more deeply for further information and will provide a scan of the 
first regulation regarding the Investor Protectior in Valencia.  
14 March 2016 - Email to the Grupo BME asking for information regarding the topic Investor 
Protector in Spain. Answer from the Library department, M.Paz Alonso Pardo (14 March 
2016), with a huge list of books, papers, magazine and official regulations regarding the 
topic.  
11 April 2016 - Email to Carlos Ochoa in order to verify if he has got the scan of the 
regulation of the Bolsa de Valencia. Answer from Carlos Ochoa (11 April) with an attached 
document with the regulation.  
There are some Conclusions we can extract from the experience we have had regarding the 
research of information and the help received by the financial institutions that are related with 
our topic. There is relatively abundant digitalized information about the regulation published 
on the websites of the institution created to protect minority investor  after 1990s. However, 
the efficiency of the mechanisms included in those websites is extremely low and not only the 
websites of the institutions do not provide help to University of Barcelona students but what 
can be really worse than that is that there is no real attention to clients and investors through 
this mechanisms. Is this really investors protection? 
As we can see, most of the emails sent have no answer from the Investor Protector 
department, so we can say that this department is as efficient as they tell? If in this case 
instead of searching information for a paper, we would have been an investor with a problem 
we would not have had any answer from the Investor Protector. On the other hand, the 
library department of the Grupo BME is doing an active work answering all the emails and 
providing lot of information regarding the topic. Also, when we had direct contact with the 
Investor Protector of Valencia, Carlos Ochoa, we had an immediate answer, but when we 
contacted with the department of the investor protection of Valencia we had no answer.  
This should make us think that there is something wrong in the communication facilities 
provided to the investors in case they have any problem, since if they try to contact them by 
email they probably will have no answer. The case of Carlos Ochoa is totally different, maybe 
exception, as we have found his direct email in Internet, but in case we had not found it, we 
would also have no answer. So, this is something that needs to change.  
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3. FIRSTS STEPS TOWARDS THE INVESTOR PROTECTION. 
INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INVESTOR PROTECTION. 
In 1929 one of the biggest stock market crashes in the history of the U.S was affecting a 
huge number of people. This devastating crisis was named “Crack of 29”. One of the main 
motives that make this crisis so devastating was the fact that the standard of living in the U.S 
was too high. People during the 20s has leveraged a lot, due to the good economic situation 
and pensioners and minority investors decided to put his money into the stock market. In this 
period, gain money in the stock market was seen to be very easy, and banks made it easier 
by putting together savings and investments. But, in 1929 this situation was anymore 
sustainable, and the market falls drastically.  
In order to overcome this situation, Franklin D. Roosevelt approve what is known as “Glass-
Steagall Act” in 1933.  This regulation is one of the greatest exponents of banking regulation. 
On one hand, it changes the direction of the functions of banks by separating investment 
banks from saving banks. On the other hand it affects the economic issues of other 
industries. 
3.1.Glass-Steagall Act, 1993  6
The Glass-Steagall Act is the name under which it is generally known the Banking Act of the 
United States, which came into force on June 16, 1933. This law was established by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation of the U.S and introduced important reforms in the 
banking sector, some of which were designed to control speculation. Among its features, the 
most important that allows for the recovery of the Crack of 1929, was the separation between 
the deposit banking and the investment banking (stock exchange). 
In 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected to become president of the United States thanks 
to its promises to end up with the Great Depression that the U.S suffered due to the Crack of 
1929. The idea of Roosevelt was to implement a set of emergency measures in order to 
control as soon as possible the situation and since there, try to improve it. All this emergency 
measures were materialized through the famous New Deal policies. As we have said before, 
among other important measures adopted by this law, the most important was to restore the 
confidence lost by people in banks. In order to recover this confidence, the Glass-Steagall 
Act separated deposit banking from investment banking. This means, that people would have 
two different accounts (if they would like). One account will be only for making investment 
operations, such as buying shares, bonds or any other financial tool, and the other one will 
be for saving money for the future or money they usually spend in day to day purchases. By 
doing this, they will be secure that in case their investment operations fail, they will always 
have the other account to survive. Thus, depositors know that their deposits were safe, and 
that the bankers did not speculate with them.  
 Information analyzed and resumed from the following working paper: Carpenter, David H and Murphy, Edward V. 6
, Murphy & M. Maureen (2016) The Glass-Steagall Act: A Legal and Policy Analysis, Washington, D.C, 
Congressional Research Service Careers.
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We need to have in mind, that the aim of this law was not to prevent another financial crisis, 
as it is very difficult since we are exposed to a huge number of elements. The aim was to 
make it more manageable in case there would exists another financial crisis in the future, 
and minimize the risk of the deposits of investors. As we have said, they will only loose the 
money they would decide invest. So, we can see that the Glass-Steagall Act is a proof of the 
concern about protecting investors and the concern they have about the relationship  that 
existed between protecting investors and market economy. We can see that the view Mauro 
F. Guillén has nowadays is not as different as in 1933 (Guillén 2016). They all know that the 
failure of investors is related with the failure of the market. 
The application of the law did not last forever, and in 1989 began its end. Due to the merge 
of two important U.S banks, the Glass-Steagall Act saw its end. By 1999 the new president of 
the U.S, Bill Clinton approved its abolition. The problem arose when banks after its abolition 
return to the situation before the Crack of 29. They began to take more risks and they offered 
to its clients operations with a huge degree of risk. We can say, that banks return to its initial 
goal, that was gain as much money as possible without taking into account the damages of 
its client and without learning anything from the crisis.  
However, the U.S has learned something from the crisis, and the FED limited the amount of 
credit that the banks could issue, but this limit was too high. When investors saw that the 
operations they were involved in had a huge level of risk, they began to withdraw all their 
investments. This situation lead to a “credit crush”. As the investors were willing to withdraw 
their investments at a time, there was a huge lack of liquidity in the market and this lack of 
liquid and confidence in the financial system had devastating consequences.  Among this 
consequences we find the fall of the giants of the U.S banking system, the Lehman Brothers 
Holdings, Inc., the fourth-largest U.S. investment bank who initiated the largest bankruptcy 
proceeding in the U.S history.  
By analyzing this situation we can put the Glass-Steagall Act as the starting point in the U.S 
for investor protection, since as far as our knowledge there is no other official regulation 
regarding this topic as concerned about investor protection as it was. But, the greed of the 
State and fundamentally of banks of make money make this law part of the history. However 
we can see how during this period people began to be concerned about the relationship 
investors and the stability of the economic market had, and this concern had prevailed since 
nowadays as Mauro F. Guillén analyzes in its paperwork.  
3.2.International differences in investor protection 
We have analyzed the situation investors in the U.S suffered during the 1930s by looking at 
the Glass-Steagall Act, but this law was only concerning the U.S, what happened to the rest 
of countries? Its important to take a look at the whole picture in order to understand better 
the situation we are living right know, and how the implementation of different strategies 
among different countries have affected their decisions. As we have said at the begging of 
this paper, and as it is said in all the books of economy, when firms want to obtain credit they 
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have always several options. One of these options is by going public and asking to the 
investors and creditors to finance its projects. Wen this happens, investors obtain what we 
call “rights”, since they have bought parr of the company by buying shares. We have also to 
keep in mind that depending on the percentage of shares an investor buy, it will have more or 
less power in the decision of the company. But, concerning our topic we will focused on those 
shares who give to investors different king and degree of rights.  
This investors are called “shareholders”, and they get the right to vote on key corporate 
matters in case the shares they had bought allow them to do so. But, the most important is 
that they had the right to receive information about he company’s operations, investment 
decisions and capital structure. Maybe not all the investors are willing to know the financial 
statements o the company, or vote for the new director, or even go to the general meeting. 
Some investors want to get an extra amount of money at the end of the day, or the week, or 
the month or even the years when collecting its investments. We will call this investors, 
minority investors. They did not have too much economic power, they want to raise its profit 
without troubles and without knowing almost anything of the entity. So, we can say that this 
minority investors need to be somehow protected and need their rights to be also protected. 
One important thing is that these minority investors have the right to be treated in the same 
way as the most important investors in the company. But, not in all kind of operations, since 
as we have mentioned there are different kinds of financial tools, only regarding dividend 
policies and securities issues.  
It is pretty obvious that when we talk about rights we are indirectly taking about regulations 
and laws, and as the Glass-Steagall Act did during 1933-1999, nowadays there are laws that 
protect investors. Most of these laws and regulations, as we will see later, are concerned 
about prove the investor the necessary information (accounting balances, debt and equity), 
so that it can easily find the best decision.  
We need to keep always in mind that investor protection encourages the development of 
financial markets, and we can see it by looking to and comparing different financial markets. 
Developed countries, those that have highly developed economies and advanced 
technological infrastructures relative to other less industrialized nations, present a higher 
concern in investor protection. This concern in protecting the investors is one of the factors 
that make them developed countries. When investors are protected against the risk of 
loosing his money, are more predisposed to invest their money and thus to contribute to the 
growth of the country. But, on the other hand, when we look at developing countries, those 
that have a less developed industrial base, we see that its degree of investor protection is 
lower. But, it is true that this countries are trying to achieve the levels of the developed ones 
by adapting its policies to the ones used by the others. In the same way, Mauro F. Guillén 
says that “the more developed and sophisticated the State bureaucracy, the harder it is for 
the State to be influenced by specific group affiliations, including professional affiliations”. 
This means that those countries that have more resources have less need to follow the 
crowd or follow the leader. They can evaluate themselves and see if they need to improve its 
investor protection or not. Therefore we expect that those countries which have a stronger 
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administrative system (developed countries) will be less prone to adopt policies consistent 
with minority investor protection just because the other countries do so.  
After taking a look at the different types of investors and countries we could find worldwide, if 
we want to compare the international differences of investor protection we need to focus on 
the studies made by Rafael La Porta during the 1990s (La Porta, 1999). As we have 
mentioned before, La Porta make a useful study comparing the differences among investor 
protection worldwide. In one of its studies the distinct between two types of investor 
protection: private and public. When talking about private investor protection, he referred on 
the private mechanisms based on standards for information disclosure and transactions 
approval (and also the ability minority investors have if they want to take court action). But, 
regulations and mechanisms can also be public. We say that they are public when they try to 
investigate actions that are contrary to minority interest.  
In order to understand better the La Porta’s study we need to understand what were the 
indexes that reflect the requirement of private protection in each country  (figure 2):  7
- Disclosure: How much information does the controlling shareholder have to reveal before 
the transaction? Does the law require a review by independent accountants or other 
experts? 
- Approval requirements: Can the controlling shareholder or the board of directors (which 
may have been elected by the controller) approve the transaction without consulting 
minority shareholders? 
- Access to redress in court: How easy is it for minority shareholders to prove wrongdoing in 
court after the transaction? How easy is it for the minority shareholders to convince the 
court to void the transaction and hold liable for damages?I  
- Rule making power: Can the supervisor issue regulations regarding primary offerings or 
stock exchange listings or does this power reside elsewhere (eg, with Parliament)? 
The public protection index reflects the requirements applicable each country  (figure 3): 8
- Independence and focus: Are there any restrictions on the ability of the central government 
to fire or hire the chief officers of the supervisory body? Is the supervisor able to focus on 
stock market regulation alone or is it also responsible for other issues such as the banking 
sector? 
- Investigative power: Does the supervisor have the power to command documents and 
testimony from controlling shareholders, accountants or other relevant parties? 
- Orders: Does the supervisor have the power to order market participants to undertake 
corrective action (eg, for insufficient disclosure)? Does the supervisor have the power to 
impose non-criminal sanctions (eg, fines)? 
 Investor Protection and the New Zealand Stock Market. International comparisons of investor protectionhttp://7
www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/ppp/2007/07-02/05.htm (Access date: 13/03/2016)
Investor Protection and the New Zealand Stock Market. International comparisons of investor protectionhttp://8
www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/ppp/2007/07-02/05.htm (Access date: 13/03/2016)
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By looking at one of the publications of Randall K. Morck we find information about what La 
Porta was studying in this period (Morck 2005). La Porta found in the 1990s that countries 
with stronger shareholder protection were characterized by larger stock market and ore 
diffusely held large corporations, and that these countries tend to have legal systems derived 
from British common law. The common-law countries that we can see in Figure 3 are 
Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Ireland, U.K, Canada, New Zeland and the U.S. They 
clearly do have more widely held large firms that the other countries. If we look for example 
at Mexico in this period all the companies were held by important families. So, La Porta 
conclude in 1999 that “diffuse ownership and shareholder capitalism require solid legal 
protection of public shareholders’ property rights in their investment”.  
In order to have a more recent view of the situation of the investor protection worldwide we 
can take a look at the World Bank Ratings (Annex 2). In this document we can find the 
countries with the best and the worst investor protection, and thus we can compare with 
recent data if this situation has changed or not.  
This ratings measure the protection of minority investors in conflicts of interest. The extent of 
conflict of interest regulation index measures the protection of shareholders against directors’ 
misuse of corporate assets for personal gain by distinguishing 3 dimensions of regulation 
that address conflicts of interest: transparency of related-party transactions (extent of 
disclosure index), extent of director liability index and access to evidence and allocation of 
legal expenses in shareholder litigation (ease of shareholder suits index). All these indexes 
as we can see were also used by La Porta when making his ratings. In Table 1 we can see 
what aspects are measured in this case in order to create the rating. 
By comparing the results obtained by La Porta and  the recent rating done by the World Bank 
Group, we can see some similarities and some differences, so we will analyze why these 
exists. First of all, we realize that the first country, if we take into account the information from 
private protection, that has the highest index in terms of investor protection is New Zealand 
in both cases. Why is this situation? What has New Zealand that does not have Afghanistan 
or Mexico?  
The World Bank group qualifies New Zealand with a total score of 9,3  and if we analyze 9
deeply each aspect measured in order to obtain this score we see that all the aspects have 
about a score of 9 points. The lower scores are obtained in the aspect of Extent of ownership 
and control index and Extent of corporate transparency index with a score of 7 points.   
The first aspect is related with the governance safeguards protecting shareholders from 
undue board control and entrenchment, and we find that for example; the CEO is not 
prohibited from also being chair of the board of directors; that the Buyer does not have to pay 
dividends within a maximum period set by law after the declaration date and finally; that 
 This information was collected as part of the Doing Business project (World Bank Group), which measures and 9
compares regulations relevant to the life cycle of a small- to medium-sized domestic business in 189 economies. 
The most recent round of data collection was completed in June 2015.
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assuming that Buyer is a limited company, the Buyer does not have to pay dividends within a 
maximum period set by law after the declaration date.  
The second aspect is related with corporate transparency on ownership stakes, 
compensation, audits and financial prospects. The reasons of this lower score is the Buyer 
does not have to disclose information about board members’ other directorships as well as 
basic information on their primary employment, that a detailed notice of general meeting 
does not have to be sent 30 days before the meeting and finally that assuming that Buyer is 
a limited company,  a detailed notice of general meeting does not have to be sent 30 days 
before the meeting.  
As mentioned before, the higher the investor protection is in a country, the higher the 
developing level in that country (and viceversa). And this is very clear when analyzing New 
Zealand. New Zealand is also the first country in the ranking of starting businesses , the first 10
country in the raking of registering property and the first country in the ranking for getting 
credit. This is not coincidence. All these aspects are correlated, the more the investor 
protection is in a country the more the investors are willing to spend his money in that 
country and therefore the more facilities to do that. This is why the facilities for getting credit 
in that country are better and this is why New Zealand is a country recommended if anyone 
wants to start a business. All this issues lead to a developed and growing country.  
And now, let’s take a look of what happens in Afghanistan (the worst rated country by the 
World Bank Group) or with Mexico (the worst by La Porta).  
Afghanistan is rated with score of 1,7 , we can see the huge difference between these two 11
countries. This score is obtained as a consequence of low ratings in all the aspects studied. 
The extent of shareholder rights index  and the extent of ownership and control index its 0. 12
This leads to a huge insecurity of investors and thus they are not willing to invest since the 
risk of the operations is very high, and nobody could guarantee their money. In the same way 
we can look at the level of development of the country. We see that Afghanistan is a 
developing country and the rating regarding starting a business is very low, and also the rest. 
This is why the country is not a developed country. The facilities given to investors in order to 
invest in that country are not enough, and thus investors see a high level of investment risk in 
that country, so the growing rate is very low.  
 Included are: the number of procedures entrepreneurs can expect to go through to start up and formally 10
operate an industrial or commercial business, as well as the time and cost to complete these procedures and the 
paid-in minimum capital requirement as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) per capita.
 This information was collected as part of the Doing Business project (World Bank Group), which measures and 11
compares regulations relevant to the life cycle of a small- to medium-sized domestic business in 189 economies. 
The most recent round of data collection was completed in June 2015.
 Shareholder’s rights and role in major corporate decisions.12
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Mexico is a country situated in the middle of these two countries, as it obtained a score of 6 
points  regarding the investor protection. This country has an average of 6 points in each 13
aspect taken into account, but in the one related with the extent of corporate transparency 
index it obtained a 3. This is because not enough information is presented to the investors 
and shareholders, there is very low transparency. Also, when looking at other rankings, we 
see that Mexico is situated in the middle also. This country is in process to become a 
developed country, but is still a developing country. This is because there are many aspects 
to be improved, but there are still good regulations and laws in the country that protect in a 
certain way investors. By improving these aspects, the country will grow faster, as investors 
will feel more secure and will invest more money.  
As we can see, these analysis lead us to the same that Mauro F. Guillén says in its 
paperwork. Afghanistan is trying to improve its situation as it is a developing country and in 
order to become a developed country it will probably try to adapt the policies followed by 
other developed countries. On the other hand, the opposite case is New Zealand. As is is 
already a developed country and it has already established its regulations and mechanisms 
regarding investor protection it is almost done in order to get a 10. It will probably try to 
improve in order to maximize its outcome but not by looking at the policies applied by 
Afghanistan. We can clearly verify that investor protection levels differ greatly among the 
world. This derives basically from the fact that legal rules are prepared taking into account 
the history and the level of development of each country.  
3.3.International differences regarding the entities  
Once we have analyzed the main differences regarding the regulations and laws applicable 
in investor protection worldwide we can focus more deeply on the differences regarding the 
entities that are in charge of applying this regulations. It is obvious that if the goal is to protect 
minority investors and nowadays countries know how can they do it, we should find more or 
less the same institutions in charge of that function in different countries. In order to verify if 
this assumption is true or not, we will take a look at the different entities that exists in Spain, 
U.S, U.K and France.   
3.3.1.Spain 
Investor protector in Spain is quite different from the other cases that will be analyzed below, 
since we find 4 stock markets in the same country, and each of them it’s important by itself. 
We find the Bolsa de Madrid, Bolsa de Barcelona, Bolsa de Valencia and the Bolsa de 
Bilbao. Each of this stock markets have its own investor protector (figure that will be explain 
in section 2 and 3), but Spain has also bodies that are above this figure and that make the 
rules of the game.  
 This information was collected as part of the Doing Business project (World Bank Group), which measures and 13
compares regulations relevant to the life cycle of a small- to medium-sized domestic business in 189 economies. 
The most recent round of data collection was completed in June 2015.
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Founded in 1782 we find the Bank of Spain, which is the national central bank and the 
supervisor of the Spanish banking system. Its activity is regulated by the Statute of the Bank 
of Spain. It has several functions, some of them are raising from its membership in the ESCB 
(European System of Central Banks) and others are as a national bank :  14
- Hold and manage foreign exchange reserves and precious metals transferred to the ECB 
(European Central Bank).  
- To promote the good functioning and the stability of the financial system without prejudice 
the functions of the ECB (European Central Bank) of national payment systems. In this 
context, the operations of liquidity emergency by entities are hold by the Bank of Spain.  
- To supervise the solvency and compliance with specific regulations of credit institutions, 
other financial institutions and markets whose supervision has been attributed.  
- Putting into circulation the coins and play, by the State, the other functions assigned to 
him.  
- Develop and publish statistics relating to its functions and assets the ECB in collecting 
statistical information.  
We find also the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores) , founded in 1988, 15
which is the agency responsible for supervision and inspection of Spanish securities markets 
and the activity of those involved in them (we will enter more deeply in the following chapters 
of this paper). Briefly, the action of the Commission is mainly projected on companies issuing 
securities.  
Created in November 1977, the FGD (Fondo de Garantía de Deposits de Entidades de 
Crédito) was aimed to guarantee deposits in cash and securities or other financial 
instruments made in credit institutions, with a limit of €100.000 for deposits in cash, or in 
another equivalent currency applying the corresponding exchange rates. It was created 
following the recommendations and experiences of some countries in the European Union 
and the United States, where there were already similar institutions. 
Finally, introduced in 1998 and being regulated by the Securities Market Act, we find the 
FOGAIN (Fondo de garantía de inversiones) , which is the general fund investment 16
guarantee, whose purpose is to provide compensations to customers of securities 
companies, securities dealers in the case that they can not pay back the money for problems 
of insolvency.  
As we can see very clear the creation of this four entities, which are the ones that are in 
charge of protecting in some way investors, were created very late. All of them were created 
 Information taken from the wen page of the  Banco de España, http://www.bde.es/bde/es/secciones/servicios/ 14
(Access date: 16/05/2016)
 Laws 37/1998 and 44/2002 have come to update the previous, establishing a regulatory framework adapted to 15
the requirements of the EU, conducive to the development of Spanish securities markets in the European 
environment, and incorporating new measures to investor protection. 
 Existing fund investments in Spain whose function is to compensate and protect investors in the event of 16
corporate insolvency services inversión. With the introduction of this figure is transposed into national law 
Directive 97/9 / EC of 3 March 1997. Its regulation is contained in Article 77 of the Securities Market Law.
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from the 70s. This is very relevant in order to understand how this system works nowadays, 
since it is a relative new system. We say it is a relative new system because, as we will see 
in the next section when analyzing the U.S, the protection systems of that country were 
created many years before. This is why Spain is trying to copy them.  
3.3.2.United States of America, the New York Stock Market 
When we talk about the US in terms of financial operations, the first we have in mind is the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  This is also known as the “Big Board” and it is by far the 
world’s largest sock exchange by market capitalization of its listed companies . In this stock 17
exchange protects are commercialized, creates products, etc…We can say that it is the basis 
of the world market and therefore it is so huge that we can not think in its fall, since otherwise 
all the other markets will fall with it.  
Created in July 2007 in the US, we find the FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority) . This body is in charge that certify if companies and financial products are legal. 18
It is in charge to guarantee to investors the reliably of what they are buying.  
In June 1934 was created the first institution with an objective of protecting investors. We are 
talking bout the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission)  and it is said to be the 19
investor counsel. This body protects investors, maintaining market integrity and facilitates the 
creation and generation of capital. In Spain we will see later that it is “equivalent”  to the 20
CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores).  
Also we find the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) , whose mission is to 21
promote transparency, competitions and financially viable open markets, to avoid systematic 
risk and to protect market users and their funds, to protect consumers and the public from 
fraud, manipulation and abusive practices related to derivatives and other products that are 
subjected to the Law on the Commodity Exchange. In Spain we can compare it with the 
MEFF (Mercado oficial español de opciones y futuros financieros). 
Finally we find the SIPC (Securities Investor Protection Corporation) . The SIPC is 22
responsible for the liquidation of the brokers when they enter bankruptcy or financial 
problems and the customer assets are missing. In a liquidation under the Investor Protection 
 "All of the World's Stock Exchanges by Size". The Money Project. Retrieved 17 April 2016.17
 Largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States. Protect investors by 18
making sure the United States securities industry operates fairly and honestly. 
 Three-part mission: to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital 19
formation
 We will say that it is equivalent in some aspects, but later we will discuss if they are more or less serious than 20
the  Comisión Nacional del Mercdo de Valores (CNMV).
 Created in 1974, that regulates futures and option markets.21
 Created in 1970 to protect the customers of brokers or dealers subject to the SIPA from loss in case of financial 22
failure of the member.
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Act, SIPC and the trustee appointed by the court work together to return securities and cash 
of customers as quickly as possible. With certain limits, SIPC accelerates the return of the 
missing property by protecting the customer. Each customer protection is up to $500.000 for 
securities and cash (including a limit of $250.000 if it is only cash) .  This body protects 23
stocks, bonds, treasury bills, certificates of deposit, mutual funds, investment funds and 
money market investments and other certain values. SIPC does not protect investments if 
the company is not a member of SIPC, loss of market share, profitability promised 
investments, commodity contracts or futures (except under certain conditions). This body can 
be comparable to FOGAIN (Fondo de garantía de inversiones).  
We should remark the importance of the U.S in the framework of investor protection. As we 
have said before, the U.S was the first country that created an institution with the mission of 
protecting the investors. Since 1934 the U.S is trying to improve its system in order to offer 
better protection to its investors and this can be seen by the creation in 2007 of another 
protecting body. The U.S was pioneer in investor protection, and this is why the rest of 
countries try to copy its system.  
3.3.3.U.K, the London Stock Market 
Founded in 1579 we find the London Stock Market. There are many sources that say it was 
officially created in 1801, but it is true that in 1600s there were exchanges of currencies and 
commodities. It is currently one of the largest stock exchanges in the world, as it has many 
international values but also many values of Births companies.  
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) is located in the City of London. This market is 
considered the third-largest stock exchange market in the world . If we have any problem in 24
the UK regarding investment projects we should first take a look at the FSA (Financial 
Services Authority). The FSA is an independent body that regulates financial services in the 
UK and that, in March 2015 was split into the following agencies:  
In one hand we have the FCA (Financial Conduct Authority) . When we find companies that 25
do not follow the rules, they intervene. This may mean intervening by imposing penalties to 
cease trading or to obtain compensation for those who had been worse off. Its aim is to 
ensure that consumers receive the information they need in the right way so that they can 
make the best decisions for themselves. We will compare this institution to the CNMN 
(Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores)  in Spain.  
 There is no requirement that a customer reside in or be a citizen of the United States. A non-U.S. citizen with an 23
account at a brokerage firm that is a member of SIPC is treated the same as a resident or citizen of the United 
States with an account at a brokerage firm that is a member of SIPC.  http://www.sipc.org/for-investors/what-sipc-
protects. (Access date: 21/04/2016)
 "All of the World's Stock Exchanges by Size". The Money Project. Retrieved 17 April 2016.24
 April 2013, operates independently of the UK government, and is financed by charging fees to members of the 25
financial services industry.
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On the other hand, we find the PRA (Prudential Regulation Authority) , which is responsible 26
for prudential regulation and supervision of banks, savings banks, credit unions, insurance 
companies and major investment firms. In total , the PRA regulates about 1.700 financial 
firms. It seemed to the Bank of Spain, this body is a part of the Bank of England.  
We have also other entities, like the FSCS (Financial Services Compensation Scheme, 
created in 2000). It is a compensation fund for customers in case they don’t have more other 
options. The FSCS covers client funds of companies regulated by the FCA and/or PRA. 
When an authorized investment company goes bankrupt and can not pay back investments, 
the portion covered will include: stocks and shares, investment funds, futures and options 
and personal pension plans and long-term investments (such as mortgage or endowments). 
This entity becomes the FGD (Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos de Entidades de Crédito) 
and the Spanish FOGAIN (Fondo de garantía de inversiones).  
From the UK Stock Market we can extract the fact that all its systems regarding the investor 
protection were created very late in comparison with the previous stock markets analyzed. 
And very related to this, we can see how much similarities are among its systems of 
protection and the Spanish ones.  
3.3.4.France, the Paris Stock Exchange 
Born in 1975 in France, we find the historical Paris Bourse, nowadays known as Euronext 
Paris from 2000 onwards. As in the rest of countries, we find some entities that have similar 
functions with respect to the other countries that would help an investor in case of some 
problem. Among them we find the AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers). This body 
regulates participants and products in the financial markets of France, authorize and monitor 
them and if it is necessary conducts investigations and issue sanctions. In addition it ensures 
that investors receive relevant information, and offers a mediation service to assist them in 
disputes. It is like the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores) in Spain.  
In 2010 it appears the ACPR (Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution, which is 
responsible for overseeing the banking and insurance in France. It is an independent 
administrative authority attached to the Bank of France, it is in charge of preserving the 
stability of the financial system and protecting customers, insurance policy holders, members 
and beneficiaries under their supervision. This body is like the Bank of Spain.  
Founded in 1999, the FGDR (Fonds de Garatie des Dépòts et de Résolution). This body is 
activated when a bank initiatives the process of bankruptcy. It is responsible of paying 
compensation to depositors within 20 days, up to €100.000 per person per institution, if the 
institution that have entrusted its assets can not fulfill their commitments. It is also 
responsible for compensating investor up to €70.000 per person per institution securities 
(stocks, bonds, shares in mutual funds), and other financial instruments that the service 
provider investment could not return if it initiates the process of bankruptcy. It is like the FGD 
 April 2013, limited company wholly owned by the Bank of England and is responsible for the prudential 26
regulation and supervision of banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and major investment firms.
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(Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos de Entidades de Crédito) and the FOGAIN (Fondo de 
garantía de inversiones) in Spain.  
The situation of France is very similar to the U.K one. As we can see no entity regarding the 
investor protection has been created before the 90s. Many of its institutions were created 
after year 2000. This could make us think that they had not the necessity of this kind of 
institutions. The same way, they are trying to copy the already existing institutions of other 
countries, and thus take advantage of their knowledge.  
3.3.5.Comparison regarding the different international entities 
After looking at this financial institutions we can highlight some relevant aspects. The most 
important one is the creation of the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) in the US. 
This is important because it was founded in 1934. And why it was founded in  this year? As 
we can see is the oldest institution among the countries studied, and this is not a 
coincidence. After its creation, the rest of the world began to think that this kind of institutions 
would be important someday.  
The SEC was created as a response of what  happened the previous years, exactly to what 
had occasioned the 1929 crack. As we have explained before the crack of 1929 was 
occasioned in part because people and the financial inceptions were confusing the function 
of banks and therefore banks were acting as investment funds for people who only wanted to 
keep its savings safe. After that, the Glass-Steagall Act enters into the role. This act was 
approved in 1933 and its function was to try to avoid this situation repeats. So, one year after 
the approval of the Glass-Steagall Act, the SEC was created, and its main aim was to protect 
investors. We can say that its creation is a consequence of this act, and since its creation, 
other countries have tried to imitate this body (for example the CNMV in Spain).  
In the US, after the creation of the SEC, about 30 years after, they created the SIPC 
(Securities Investor Protection Corporation), another body that aims to protect the investors. 
Four years later, in 1974 the US created the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission) in order to promote transparency. So, we see that the creation of this kind of 
bodies is following an increasing path, and that governments have seen its importance by 
promoting its creation.  
The most surprising thing that we can extract from these entities is that almost all the entities 
(except the ones in the US mentioned before) are created very late. When we say very late 
we are saying that they are very recent. Why the US anticipated the need of these entities 
before the rest of the world? Why the rest of the countries decide to create them so late? 
The answer to these questions is that, first of all, we can see and check that countries (and 
also people) only react and make changes if something bad has happened. And this is what 
has happened in US after the 1929 crack and the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008. So, once 
the rest of the countries have suffered some problem regarding the protection of the 
investors, they have decided to create its own entities. Action and then reaction. Even the 
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previous case mentioned about the figure of the investor protector in Spain was created late, 
more or less in the year 1991 due to the reform in the “Ley del Mercado de Valores” of 1989.  
4. ORIGINS OF MINORITY INVESTOR PROTECTION (MIP) IN 
SPAIN. 
Following the objective of this paper, we will now focus more deeply in the tools used in 
Spain in order to protect investors. In Spain, one of the most important parts that are 
included in the regulation “Ley del Mercado de Valores” and concern our topic is the one that 
talks about the effective protection of the investor’s rights. As we have said in the section 
above, this function is integrated and done by many entities. The steps that need to be 
followed in order to achieve a good investor protection in Spain require an active participation 
of all the agents that are involved in the process (even investors, since they should know 
their rights and obligations). In order to have a good level of investor protection is essential to 
have a high level of transparency, a good level of juridic guarantee and simplified, a good 
level of development in the Spanish Stock market. By this, we mean that one of the facts that 
will give more confidence to investors is information. Information is power and investors want 
entities to be transparent in order to get as much information as they want in order to make 
proper decision. Furthermore, without a good juridic framework the application of this laws 
would not be possible.  
This objective implies for some entities, like the Comisión Nacional del Mercdo de Valores 
(CNMV), activities such as the verification and the administrative registration of the products 
that are offered to the investors, in the sense that all the products that will be offered to the 
investor need to be approved by the Comisión Nacional del Mercdo de Valores (CNMV). The 
supervision of the activities done by the financial intermediaries (such as banks, brokers of 
financial funds) are also very important in order to control for transparency and good will. But 
the most important, is that all this financial institution need to follow the same obligations that 
are in the regulations and laws inside the stock markets, and this is what at the end make a 
kind of heterogeneous stock market as the Spain one, homogenous in some sense.  
However it is not possible to guarantee the fully integrity of the investment operations. We 
need to take into account that stock markets are continuously changing, every second, and it 
they are evolving more and more every day thanks to new technologies. As in other 
European countries, it was the liberal revolution who laid the investor protection in Spain 
appear. The institutions of the old regime provided limited guarantees to investors and in 
case of conflict of interest among parties, juridical processes were not so clear. All this issues 
motivate the Spanish financial authorities to reevaluate the situation and change some 
policies as the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) that will be explained 
below.  
4.1.Investor Protection in Spain 
Since 1951, at the age of 31 years old, and with his oppositions for Exchange Agent 
approved, José Manuel Núñez-Lagos has published many books and articles related with 
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financial entities and stock markets from the E.U to the U.S (Núñez-Lagos, 1977) . We can 
say that Núñez-Lagos has been the Spanish pioneer in terms of investor protection. He was 
always concerned about the importance of teaching investors how to make operations and 
the power the information has.  
This permanent desire of Núñez-Lagos of being in contact and to approach the minority 
investor, meet their demands and try to guide them, presided over not only the spirit of his 
literary works, but also in all of its collaborations with the media and the press.  
In 1991, he was appointed by the Board of Directors of the Madrid Stock Exchange, Investor 
Protector, a position created at that time and for which his character and training were 
perfectly suited (as demonstrated throughout the decade in which he served in that position). 
It was the first Investor Protector at a time in which assistance to investors was not as 
widespread as it is right now. Therefore, he had to invent all the systems that nowadays are 
running the office of this figure.  
During the 10 years he worked in that field, he and his team released reports, proposals, 
documents and resolutions, always with a huge judgement and clarity. Thanks to him, the 
assistance to the investor is instituted. The first one is very important and is related to the 
juridic aspect. It is very important to pose every case with a juridic point of view and taking 
into account the economic effects it will have. Secondly, the Investor Protector has to try to 
solve the cases by searching for an agreement good for both parties. Lastly, in case that no 
agreement has been reached, the investor protector will be the one who decide.  
Not so long ago, approximately 25 years ago, the resolution of claims and complaints that 
clients made in Spain was managed by the department of complaints in the Comisión 
Nacional del Mercdo de Valores (CNMV) . This department was formed by the investor 27
defenders located in the four different stock markets that are in Spain and by the figure of the 
Client Defender  that exists in determined financial entities. 28
As we can see, there was not a unique solution in the case an investor has a problem, and 
there was not a unique procedure in order to solve the problem since each of the four figures 
had different terms and conditions. These are the reasons of why investors were so lost 
when making complaints, they did not know exactly where to go. Furthermore, this situation 
still happens, since the situation in Spain, as we will see, is still confusing for some of them, 
because there are not many facilities and information as it should be.  
Legislative measures imposed in the recent years oriented to reinforce transparency and the 
accomplishment of good practices in the markets, as the Markets in Financial Instruments 
 The CNMV addresses complaints from users of investment services when they consider that their investments 27
have been harmed by the conduct of persons or entities under the supervision of the CNMV.
 Law 44/2002 of 22 November on Measures to Reform the Financial System and Order ECO / 734/2004 of 11 28
March on the Department or Customer Service and Customer Ombudsman of financial institutions .
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Directive (MiFID) , had came so solve the problem of heterogeneity. Nowadays we have a 29
more homogenized system in the sense that the procedures that an investor has to follow in 
case of any problem are more or less the same in all the stock markets in Spain. We should 
make stress in that point, since this homogenization has helped the users in a world every 
day more advanced in terms of variety of products and the complexity of the financial 
services.  
Specifically, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) wanted to create a figure 
for the defense of the clients of financial services. At the same time, this normative would 
delimitate the processes and steps that the investors should do in order to make their 
complaints. All in a simple and guided way, which will increase the systems of investment 
protection.  
4.2.Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID) 
Entered into force in Spain in 2007, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is 
the european normative which harmonizes the regulation of the European stock markets, the 
financial instruments which are negotiated in and the organization and the relations that the 
financial entities have with their clients and the investor protection. In order to understand 
better what are the main functions of that European normative, we could ask ourselves some 
questions: First, are all the financial entities obliged to apply the MiFID? The answer is yes. 
All the financial entities that provide services and inversion activities of financial instruments 
(such shares, obligations, rights, collective inversion, derivatives) had to comply with the 
normative.  
Second, the measures applied by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in 
terms of protection of the investors are the same for all kind of operations? For example, if an 
investor buys shares from an investment fund or if he/she buys futures? Then answer is no. 
Inside all the products that are treated in the MiFID there is a difference between simple and 
complex products. This distinction will determine the level of protection and information that 
the financial entity is obliged to supply. The more complex a product is, the more information 
and the more protection the investor will have.  
Third, what are the main differences between the original and the new version of the MiFID? 
One of the main goals of the original Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is to 
ensure good levels of protection of investors inside the European Union. As we have said 
before, all the financial entities that are in the EU are required to provide their clients 
adequate information (transparency), and to complain with certain obligations. Also, there is 
a general duty for all this firms, which is to act fairly, professional and honestly, and always 
searching the best for its clients.  
 The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC as subsequently amended is a European Union law 29
that provides harmonized regulation for investment services across the 31 member States of the European 
Economic Area (the 28 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein). The directive's main 
objectives are to increase competition and consumer protection in investment services
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The application of all this duties reflects differentiated protection for retail and for professional 
clients, and the transactions that are executed with eligible counterparts are only subject to 
some of these duties. Furthermore, those firms which only execute or act as a “bridge” 
between the clients and the investment they want to do, do not need to conduct a suitability 
assessment provided certain conditions are met. So, we find that there is a legal gap in this 
normative.  
Once the Commission noticed about that, it started to review some provisions of the 
Directive. We have to keep in mind that the context of this period was the huge financial 
crisis suffered in 2008, and this crisis helped in some way to expose the weaknesses of the 
regime. The Commission published in 2010 a paper with some changes in the Directive. 
Finally, in 2011 they decided that the best they could do was make some changes, according 
to the changing and complex financial environment we were living.  
The final version of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) contains 
important changes to the investor protection regime, which is what concern us in this paper. 
The new duties will affect the entire lifecycle of the investment products and services. The 
design, the promotion and marketing and the distribution and selling of financial products by 
investment firms must be tailored to the target market. Meaning that if the financial 
environment is good, financial entities could push clients to make investment, but if it is the 
opposite situation, firms must look for the wellbeing of the client and do not allow them to 
make operations with risk. So, we can resume the most important changes regarding the 
reinforce in investor protection as follow:  
As we can observe in the summary table in the Annex Section (Table 2), there are more 
sectors and products covered. While in the MiFID I, there is only the distinction between 
equities and other products, in the MiFID II, there is a more specific distinction. It 
distinguishes among equity, fixed income, commodities, structured products and derivatives. 
This a positive thing for the investors, since the financial advisors who will help them will be 
more specialized and therefore possible problems will be solved quicker, and the advice 
provided will be better, as it will fit better in the client expectations.  
How does the MiFID works? 
When searching for information regarding the investor protection in Spain we find lots of 
documents and reports regarding the steps followed by the MiFID. These steps, after looking 
at various documents can be divided as follows:  
a. Before investing  
In this step, first the financial institution will classify the investor taking into account various 
conditions.  
Usually, investors who are engaged in some investing process have already received a letter 
regarding the type of investor they are. The huge majority of investors are considered 
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minority investors (although there are professionals). This classification is very important in 
order to state the specific processes that will be followed in each case, since they are 
different for minority investors and for professionals . As we are concerned on minority 30
investors we will try to resume only the steps for them.  
The minority investors are those who have less knowledge and experience in the financial 
investing world, and this is why, as a minority investors they will receive a higher grade of 
protection. On the other hand, the professional clients, as they have more knowledge and 
experience will receive less protection.  
After this first classification, the investor will be required, by the financial institution, to answer 
some questions in order to collect information, and thus help him when taking decisions and 
providing services. This set of questions, called Convenience Test, will allow the financial 
entity to decide if a financial product is good enough for the investor. 
The Convenience Test tries to evaluate the knowledge and the experience of each investor, 
and the questions asked will be: types of products and services the investor is related with, 
frequency and volume of its previous operations and the level of studies and professional 
experience among others.  
Once the financial entity gets the results, the advice round will come. Taking the results of the 
previous test another test, called the Suitability Test, will be done. This test consist in the 
good advice provided by the financial entity taking into account the personal situation and the 
knowledge and experience. The difference between this test and the first one, is that the 
Suitability Case will cover also the financial situation of the investor, the capital, liquidity, 
liabilities and the objectives of the operation (time, profile, risk).  
After these two tests, the financial entity will send all the needed information to the client. 
This information has to be impartial, clear and without any type confusion. All this information 
should be sent with sufficient advance so the client can understand it and take a calm and 
not precipitated decision.  
b. While and after investing  
Once the client has taken the decision the financial entity will execute this decision as soon 
as possible. An important point in this step is that, the financial institutions should take what 
is called “the best choice”. This choice has to achieve the best outcome for the client.  So, 
lets imagine that an investor wants to buy shares from a company in the Stock Market. The 
mots valuable inflation for the client will be the one regarding the price and the costs of the 
operation.  
After this step, the entity will confirm that all the decision are transmitted will inform the client 
during all the process of the evolution of the operation. This continuous advice is very 
 Professional clients can be banks, governments, investment funds, pension funds, enterprises and maybe 30
some particular investors (with high level of knowledge and experience). 
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important. The entity should inform the client of any important change in its operation in order 
to led the client sufficient time to take a decision (if necessary).  
c. During all the process 
As we can observe, this instrument is more related with prevention than with protection. This 
is why during all the process the entity will try to avoid any type of interest conflict and will 
inform the client of the guarantee fund (explained in Section 4, point 5) in case of insolvency. 
In case of any claim for the bad performance of the entity, the client is in title for complaint. 
This complain is not the same that the one done to the Investor Protector. This complain is 
regarding the bad performance of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) by 
the financial institution. 
5. THE FIGURE OF THE INVESTOR PROTECTOR IN SPAIN. 
Entering more deeply in the analysis of the investor protection in Spain we have finally 
arrived to the most specific figure we can find. We say it is the most specific since it is the 
one in charge of each of the different stock markets in Spain. We have seen the main 
differences regarding international investor protection, comparing all the countries by an 
index. Then, we have been more focused by analyzing the entities in charge of applying the 
regulations and comparing them worldwide. Afterwards, we have analyzed the main 
regulations that exists in Spain regarding the topic. And now we will be studying the figure in 
charge of investor protection in each of the four stock markets in Spain.  
The figure of Investor Protector in the Spanish stock market appears very linked to the “Ley 
de Reforma del Mercado de Valores de 1989”. This law allowed to the modernization of all 
the processes and steps towards sock market transactions by simplifying and harmonizing 
them. Briefly we can say, that this law, together with the technological advances, gave rise to 
the substitution of the old models and mechanisms to the new ones. The most important of 
these new models and mechanisms is that there are almost all mede online. The old 
mechanisms were bored and very slow and thus if an investor has a problem it would take 
too long to solve it. Nowadays new technologies have allowed to many important changes in 
investor protection such as: direct contact with the institutions by mail or by telephone, a and 
huge number of documents and pdfs in Internet regarding the topic. We all have that image 
inside the stock market : stressed people everywhere, very noisy, too much bustle. Thanks to 
this this reform all this noise disappeared, and the silence of the computers began.  
An important figure that we must keep in mind during this beginning period was Manuel 
Pizarro, who was the president of the Madrid Stock Exchange during two periods; the first 
from July 1991 to December 1992, and the second from July 1994 to December later 
exercise. His presidency was alternated with Antonio Zoido  during the periods not 31
mentioned above. In 1991, Pizarro appointed José Manuel Núñez Lagos Investor Protector 
 Actual presidente of the BME (Bolsas y Mercados Españoles) ; Spanish company that deals with the 31
organizational aspects of the Spanish stock exchanges and financial markets, which includes the stock 
exchanges in Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao and Valencia.
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of the Madrid stock market since 2001. We can say that Pizarro was the one who really 
supported and launched the figure of the Investor Protector in Spain. Later on, this figure has 
been seen as an important factor in the good behavior of the Spanish Stock Market, since as 
we will see below since is approval it has improved a lot.  
We should keep in mind, before going more deeply into the functions done by the Investor 
Protector, that this figure is based in the transparency between the financial operators and 
the clients. The general principles that inspire the actuation of the Investor Protection are the 
auto regulation, the conflict of a bad investment and equity among others.  
Once the Stock Market is seen by the population as a tool open to everybody, not only 
reduced to a limited group of savers, the financial institutions saw the importance of establish 
the processes that this figure need to follow in order to cope with the complexities, risks and 
uncertainties that threaten the stock market of that time.  
The process, the functions, the duration and the conditions to become an Investor Protection 
are collected in the “Circular 8/1991” , we will explain below the most important points inside 32
this paper. 
5.1.Investor Protector: Process of selection and duration 
In oder to understand better the points that will be explained better later, we need to keep in 
mind what is the main function and the definition of Investor Protector. The Investor Protector 
is the figure of the Spanish Stocks Markets in charge of the attendance of the complains and 
reclamations that the investors could have in relation with financial operations effectuated in 
the four Spanish Stock Markets  (remark that each of the four Stock Markets has its own 33
Investor Protector ). This figure is designed by the Administration Council of each of the four 34
Spanish Stock Markets among persons of recognized competence and experience in the 
stock market. 
Having autonomy to perform their functions, without depending on any other department, this 
figure freely dispose of the material and administrative services necessary to perform its 
tasks. The designation lasts for a period of 3 years, and may be reappointed for successive 
periods. In case one of the reasons below happen, its operations will be ceased immediately:  
Firs of all, and the most obvious, in case that the period for which it was elected ended. But 
keep in mind, that after this 3 years period it can be reelected. In case of waiver by the 
person in charge of the title during the period. In this case there will be another investor 
 Regulates the appointment, powers and mode of action of Investor Protector.32
 Madrid was the firs to create the figure of the Investor Protector and fulfill its characteristics in 1991, then 33
Barcelona in 1995, Valencia in 2000, and the Bilbao unknown. 
 By comparing the different papers and regulations, we have found that the functions, designation and 34
performance of the Investor Protector in the four Spanish Stock Markets is the same, so we have taken the 
example of the Madrid Stock Market (the first in approving the figure in 1991) in order to explain its 
characteristics. 
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protector selected as soon as possible. Also it’s obvious in case of death or incapacity to 
make the performance of the task. An finally in case that its performance is notoriously 
negligent in the operation of its duties and functions, when  appreciated by the Board of 
Directors of the Stock Exchange, by a majority of three quarters of tis members. Meaning 
that if the Board of Directors thinks that the Investor Protector is not acting under what it is 
supposed to do, it will be ceased of its activity.  
5.1.1.Functions 
The functions that are attributed to the figure of the investor protection are in someway 
defined before, but this are the ones we can find specifically in its regulation. Firstly, the 
investor protector will be the one in charge of examining and solving the claims and 
companies that any investor or financial entity have. Always if this person or entity has 
relation with transactions in the Stock Exchange and actions directly related with these. 
When carrying out all its function the Investor Protector should, in particular:  
- Examine the complaints and claims that individuals make in relation with the activities of 
the various departments of the Stock Market. Meaning that the Investor Protector will 
only be in charge of those complains that are in relation with the departments in the 
Stock Market, not others.  
- Consider with the members of the Stock Market the claims that individuals submitted in 
relation to decisions taken by them. In case of any doubt about the decisions taken by 
the members of the Stock Market, the Investor Protection should consult them what had 
happened.  
- Analyze, with the assistance of credit institutions, financial intermediaries, issuers and 
other persons and entities interested in the operations taken place in the Stock Market, 
claims that individuals make in connection with the initiatives and/or actions taken by 
such persons and/or entities. In cases where the Investor Protection is not sure about 
the numbers of some economic transaction it could have the assistance of experts.  
- Prepare and submit to the Board of Directors of the Sock Market reports, 
recommendations, proposals, suggestions and initiatives that will benefit investors. In 
order to improve its function it is said to transmit all the claims and recommendations to 
the board of directors in order to make possible changes.  
On the other hand, the functions that are excluded from the competencies and performances 
of the Investor protection are those related with claims and complaints which process and 
resolution could cause damages to third parties. Matters that are not yet solved by the 
Courts, in the sense that if there is some juridical process opened the Investor Protector 
could not intervene. Complaints that are pending to solve by another equivalent body of any 
entity, as for example the department of complaints of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
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Directive (MiFID). And finally complains that are pending to be solved by the Comisión 
Nacional del Mercdo de Valores (CNMV) and the Complaints Service of the Spanish Bank .  35
5.1.2.Procedures 
Those who are interested should contact the Investor Protector by letter including the name, 
surname, identification number (DNI) and address, or the equivalent information in case of 
being an entity or a juridic person. All the operations and performances done by the Investor 
Protector will be for free and without any cost for the users.  
Once the Investor Protector receive the latter, it will be registered and processed. In case 
that the claim does not fulfill the conditions to be processes it can be refused : bad faith, 
manifest of lack of foundation and clear lack of pretension.  In cases where the Investor 
Protector considers that the content of the claims done by the client are matters of another 
entity or institution, he/she will inform the client in order to change of entity.  
In those cases where the complain can begin, the Investor Protection will do the claim and 
will go to the services, departments or entities in charge with the problem in order to let them 
know that a problem exists.  
Investor Protector may seek for the cooperation of various departments and services of the 
Stock Market and its members, and coordinate their actions with the Commission develop 
Market Surveillance.  
The performance of the Investor Protector will finish when he/she presents the final report. 
5.2.Analysis of the number of interventions of the Investor Protector 
After analyzing the main functions and the paper of the Investor Protector in the Spanish 
Stock Market we should make ourselves two questions. First of all, if all these functions are 
accomplished and the users are satisfied with its work, and secondly how many claims or 
complaints the Investor Protector have received in order to see if this figure is totally 
necessary.  
We will begin first analyzing the number of claims received by the Investor Protector during 
the years 1992-2008 in order to see its necessity for then try to answer the first question.  
In Figure 5 we have the information collected and classified by years and by the Spanish 
magazine “A fondo : Bolsa”, regarding the claims of the investors. As we can see, there is a 
clear tendency to reduce the number of claims as we move forward in time. This means, 
between the second year after the creation of the figure of the Investor Protector in Spain 
 Resolves claims and complaints made by users of the entities supervised by the Banco de España with the aim 35
of securing their interests and legally recognized rights, as a consequence of alleged non-compliances by the 
entities against which the claims are made, of the regulations on transparency and protection of customers or of 
good financial practices and uses.
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(1991) and 2001 there was a huge number of claims, but after 2001 this number has 
decreased a lot. The most surprising here is that in 2000 and 2001 we find the maximum 
number of claims found during this period, but just the year after, 2002, the number of claims 
had beed reduced to a quarter. Why this difference? 
Before commenting the activity of the Investor Protector during the years 2000-2001, we 
should take into account that in June 2001, Carlos Fernández González had been named 
Investor Protector in substitution to José Manuel Nuñez-Lagos.  
During 2000-2001 exceptional circumstances had happened and had changed the 
framework of the economy. One of the most remarkable is the IPO (Initial Public Offering) 
done by Inditex during this period. This IPO was very expected by investors and was 
welcome by all of them. Maybe this situation is the guilty of the decrease in the number of 
interventions that have finalized with an agreement. We can see in Figure 5 that in 2001 we 
find 27 agreements finalized while in 1998 for example, we find 58. We could think that due 
to this IPO more people were engaged in investment operations and thus there were more 
claims, and thus also more of them not solved. In this sense, its important to remark that the 
claims and reports received by the Investor Protector during this period are not relevant, 
since we can not base our analysis in a very specific situation. The lack of agreement had 
been reflected in the high number of final favorable reports to the user, that supposed 50% of 
the total claims done in front of the 16% in 2000.  
If we take a look at the contentious consultations, we find a little decline in 2001 and since 
this year it decreased to its minimum in 2007. In this sector we take into account the claims 
that don’t become a conflict, meaning that they are simply explanations or clarifications that 
the investor does not know, so they are solved by an explanation or a better interpretation of 
the Investor Protector. This is very important in the sense that every year investors know 
better their rights and obligations and thus they have less consultations.  
In relation to the non competent claims, we see that there is also a decrease in 2001, which 
indicate that every year the investor has more knowledge about the existence and the 
performance of the Investor Protector. We see that in 2008 this sector only has 7 claims, 
which is a good new for the Investor Protector, every day more known by the investors.  
Finally we can see also an important aspect that we will see more deeply when answering 
the second question. We see that the number of the pending claims has its maximum also in 
year 2000, and since this year it has decreased a lot, even with years with no pending 
claims.  
We can find also in newspapers, hemeroteca ABC, news regarding this figure in 1993. This 
should make us think that this figure was well received by the investors and that was such 
important that even the newspapers talk about it. By looking in the newspaper ABC of the 15 
of November 1993, we find that there is one page dedicated only to the Investor Protector. 
We see that this publication is done two years after the appointment of José Maria Núñez-
Lagos as the Investor Protector of the Madrid Sotck-Market. In this article they talk about the 
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increment  of the number of claims received by this figure by comparing to the previous year. 
Also, they explain the methods and the steps to make a claim and what are the functions of 
this figure. This is very important, since by doing this article they make know this figure to the 
rest of investors that may not know that it existed.  
Once we know the evolution of the number of claims and complain that the investor protector 
has received since its creation we are able to answer the first question: are all the functions 
accomplished and the users are satisfied about its performance? By looking at the tables 
shown in Annex (Table 3) we can clearly see that the number of favorable agreements have 
increase  and the number of pending agreements has decrease. This could let us think that 
the figure of the Investor Protector is every day working better.  
By looking at Figure 6, we can see the total number of claims solved by the percentage of 
reports favorables, unfavorables and agreements done by the Investor Protector since 
1992-2008. By comparing these figures, we can conclude that the number of favorable 
reports and the number of agreements done is much higher that the number of unfavorable 
reports. 
This means that every day people is more concerned about how this figure works, as they 
make less unsuitable complaints and thus there are less unfavorable reports. Also, we can 
conclude that this figure is working well, since the number of agreements and favorable 
reports is higher.  
6. RESEARCH AGENDA 
We have studied and analyzed different aspects regarding the Investor Protection 
internationally and more focused in Spain. When searching for information we have seen that 
there are still topic that have not been yet studied. One of this topics is why there still 
differences among the four stock markets that exist in Spain. This is a very good example of 
what we were saying at the beginning of the paper. Even if we have some homogenous 
regulations in Spain that regulate all the stock markets, we still have an heterogeneous 
framework between the four stock markets. Aa we have more or less analyzed by looking at 
the regulations of each of the four stock markets, the differences are very small, but still exits. 
Another important topic that is very related with the protection of minority investors is Insider 
Trading as we will see. Directly it seem that this would not affect investors, one we are in 
front of a crisis or a process of bankruptcy of some financial institution we see how those 
who have privileged information are better off. And, as Randall K. Morck and Mauro F. 
Guillén stated in their papers, when an investor is damaged it damages all the market.  
Guarantee Funds in Spain are also another little-known topic. When searching in documents 
related with investor protection, the information found regarding the functions and how 
investor could addresses itself to this institution is very poor. This institution are as important 
as the regulations and the other official entities when investors have a problem. We could 
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even say that they are more important, since they will be the ones that in case of any issue 
will provide a compensation for the damages (in case no juridical process is opened).  
And finally, investor associations are nowadays growing more and more, in part thanks to 
internet since we can see many blogs and webpages where minority investors share their 
problems. However, this institutions are not official, there is not an official body in charge of 
regulating this institutions. They could be a good point of information for investors, and also a 
good support for those minority investors that have troubles.  
6.1.Why there are still differences among the four different stock markets in 
Spain?  36
We can affirm that the Madrid Stock Exchange is the Spanish securities market where, by 
far, more securities and stocks are traded and, where there is a greater volume of business 
that in the rest of stock markets of Spain. But, we should take in mind that the Madrid Stock 
Market is not the only institution of Spain, we have also the Barcelona, Bilbao and Valencia 
Stock Markets with their own personality. Basically different path-dependent prevours 
institutional developments, we will shortly indicate a few of them below.  
6.1.1.The Madrid Stock Market 
During all its life, the high trading volume, the high degree of liquidity and admission to 
trading for the most important companies in the country have led to the Madrid Stock 
Exchange to the most important stock market in Spain.  
Since its first trading session on 20 October 1831, the Madrid Stock Exchange has been 
characterized by its intense effort to lead all the reforms that have taken place in the Spanish 
financial context in recent years. We can say that today, when we are talking about the 
Spanish Stock Market, is to talk practically about only the Madrid Stock Exchange.  
Investors go to this stock exchange attracted by the constant revaluation of the securities. 
The Madrid Stock Exchange is open to large investment companies, but also to smell savers 
(minority investors) who put their trust in the high liquidity of it.  
The minority investors often rely on markets that offer advantages such as achieving the 
minimum risk, get a high volume of daily trading, the quality of the emission and a high 
professional capacity of its intermediaries.  
The Madrid Stock Exchange has currently one of the most advanced trading systems and 
information dissemination: the SIBE (Spanish Stock Exchange Interconnection System) 
electronic network. This system reduces or even eliminates the distance between the 
investor, broker and the stock market itself.  
 Banco Inversis, ¿Cómo invertir en Bolsa? Recovered from: https://www.inversis.com/ets/guiabolsa/4.htm 36
(Access date: 17/03/2016) 
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6.1.2.The Barcelona Stock Market 
The activity of this market has its origins in the “Antigua Lonja de Mar”, where the contracts 
were initiated in the late fourteenth century. The beginning of its official career as 
contemporary values market begin on 10 July 1915.  
From the moment of its creation it has been characterized by its intense effort in boosting 
small and medium Catalan enterprises.  
This commitment to the SMEs has reached its greatest achievement with the creation of the 
ARC Service (Advice for Restructuring of Capital). This organization aims to approach the 
stock market exchange of the SMEs in order to improve its financial structure by raising 
funds in the stock market.  
In the recent years, the recruitment in the Catalan market has benefited from the new 
electronic system, launched in May 1994.  
The creation of the BCN Global 100 index, in January 1997, had been an improvement in 
trading. This benchmark is composed of 100 securities totaling the IBEX-35 index, the 
Mid-50 Catalan (which groups the 50 main values of Barcelona), and the following 15 titles 
with more weight in the Catalan market.  
6.1.3.The Bilbao Stock Market 
Throughout its 110 years, the Bilbao Stock Exchange has been characterized as a market 
with a clear entrepreneurial spirit by their drivers, businessmen and traders who, over time, 
have helped to make the Bilbao market the second Spanish stock market by trading volume.  
Since its brith, the Bilbao Stock Exchange has grown parallel to the evolution of the industrial 
activity in the Basque country, becoming a source of funding for major projects such as the 
construction of shipyard, shipping or mining companies.  
6.1.4.The Valencia Stock Market  
Shortly before the discovery of the New World , in 1482, a large commercial activity was 37
developed on the Mediterranean. In those dates, the “Lonja de Valencia” was created. 
Centuries later, in 1980, numerous attempts to formalize the Valencia market eventually 
materialize in the creation of the Valencia Stock Exchange.  
Today, the main activities of this market are centered in the tradition, in the agricultural 
market. Companies are related to the sale of vegetables, fruits and other food products 
which have more room in the younger of the markets in the Spanish territory.  
 The New World is one of the names used for the Western Hemisphere, specifically the Americas (including 37
nearby islands such as those of the Caribbean and Bermuda).
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After taking a brief view to the history and the main activities that each stock market has in 
Spain, we can say that the differences that exist among them are due to the fact that they 
have different histories and they have been created according to different necessities. So, 
the answer may be that each stock market has been created due to the necessities of each 
territory: in Catalonia in order to help the SMEs, in Valencia for agricultural companies, in 
Bilbao for construction companies and Madrid has the biggest enterprises of Spain (it is the 
oldest market). 
6.2.Insider Trading   38
At the beginning of this paper we have mentioned the huge crisis that suffered the U.S when 
one of is most important banks went into bankruptcy, we are talking about the Lehman 
Brothers case. In Spain we have a similar case that was done by Bankia due to an IPO not 
well studied. But, not all the people in this two cases were damaged, we can find some 
people that get profits behind. This is why the financial institutions are very concerned with 
the “insider trading”. This practice led the minority damage while the big ones get profits.  
When we talk about insider trading we are taking about the method of trading used by 
individuals with access to nonpublic information of the company, which consists in trading 
stocks  or other securities of public companies (shares, bonds, stock options). We can clary 
see that this is not faire to the other investor who do not have this privileged information, and 
this could lead to huge problems in case this information is really devastating.  
In Spain, the article 82 of the “Ley del Mercado de Valores” (LMV), oblige to the issuers to tell 
to both the market and the Comisión Nacional del Mercdo de Valores (CNMV), any kind of 
information that could be relevant, with the objective that all the investors have access, at the 
same time, to identical information that may affect their decisions.  
When does this situation become a problem for the investors? A certain type of information 
becomes privileged when its divulgation would have changed the decisions of the investors, 
and therefore the values of the market. For example; a financial director of a company is 
preparing an IPO. It is totally forbidden for him to anticipate to this action and buying by 
himself shares of the company. This could be maybe the case of Bankia. It is possible that 
some of its directors and employees knew that the company will do an IPO, and they assure 
their positions by buying shares. It is obvious that they had not been harmed, but the rest of 
investors yes. n this case, the financial director has negotiated with advantage by using its 
privileged information in order to obtain a positive result for him, an assured benefit with the 
IPO. 
The sanctions due to insider trading are very huge. The sanction to the infractor can be up to 
300.000€ or five times the obtained benefit. The worst sanction is the one in which the 
 Information analyzed and studied from the following article : Zunzunegui, F. (2006) “¿Qué es el insider trading? 38
“, Revista de Derecho del Mercado Financiero, published in Expansion, Madrid, Edited by Zunzunegui.
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revenues obtained by doing this operation are higher than 600.000€, and it will be sanctioned 
with jail (up to 6 years).  
For this case, the sanction is only for the people who are very conscious they have privileged 
information. This is the reason because there is no insider trading when an investor decides 
to make an operation taking into account rumors or information heard for causality or 
unknown people.  
Insider trading is one of the problems the society is facing nowadays. Maybe there are every 
day cases in which people get better off by using privileged information, but as there is any 
problem nor any crisis, they are not investigated. In order to solve this problem we should not 
only be concerned about the sanctions. It is true that if people know how higher is the section 
they will probably think twice if it is worth it do practice insider trading or not, but maybe we 
could introduce new policies. By increasing awareness in people who have the power of 
privileged information, telling them the importance of making good practices we could solve 
many cases. As we have seen, when an isolated investor is damaged the rest of the world do 
not see it. When when the number of investors damaged is too large, the whole economy is 
affected.   
6.3.Guarantee Funds in Spain   39 40
Another instrument that could be used by investors in order to protect themselves of possible 
processes of bankruptcy or insolvency are the Guarantee Funds. The Comisión Nacional del 
Mercdo de Valores (CNMV) provides information regarding the guarantee funds in case of 
insolvency in one of its publications. In this publication is stated that in case of insolvency 
from the company which is providing investing services to the client, and in which the client 
had rely on, the client could request for a compensation. 
It’s very important that the financial institution inform to its clients that it exists a guarantee 
fund or compensation fund in case any problem happen. But, this sounds familiar, isn’t it? 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) oblige to entities to inform of any 
possible service they could offer to its clients. So, it is obvious that entities should inform its 
clients that this entities exists. Furthermore, there is a point in the MiFID which talks very 
briefly about its existence and oblige firms to have one of them. But, this is not done in all 
cases.  
If we are an investor and we have lost our money due to an insolvency or bankruptcy 
process what we really want to know  is: first, what is a guarantee fund? And secondly and 
the most important, until where I am covered? What is the maximum compensation? But 
 Salvador, V (2013) Fondo de garantía de depósitos de todos los países recovered from : http://39
www.rankia.com/blog/mejores-depositos/1818675-fondo-garantia-depositos-todos-paises (Access date: 
03/04/2016)
 CNMV, (2016) Preguntas y respuestas sobre los efectos prácticos de la nueva protección al inversor (MiFID) 40
para los inversores minoristas.
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maybe once the worst has happened this question are totally useless, since guarantee funds 
should be hired since the very beginning.  
Answering the first question, in Spain, the Guarantee Fund  (FOGAIN) is financed by banks, 
savings banks, credit cooperatives and the Bank of Spain, in order to cover the losses of the 
clients of financial entities in case of insolvency. 
Created in November 1997, FOGAIN has the objective of protecting the investors (and more 
important, the savers), and also with the objective to become a discipline instrument for the 
credit institution, so in case of insolvency they will know what they have to do. It was creating 
following the recommendations and the experiences of some of the EU countries and also 
the US (where these founds already existed).  
Until the year 2011, in Spain we had three types of different guarantee funds: one for the 
banks, another of the saving banks and another to the credit cooperatives. With the approval 
of the “Real Decreto Ley 16/2011”, of 14 October, all these entities had been unified thanks 
to the creation of the FGDEC (Fondo de Garantía de Depositos de Entidades de CreditO, 
abbreviated FDG) as mentioned in Section 1.  
Now, let’s analyze the coverage of this fund, and see if there is any difference between Spain 
and other countries.  
This fund (FDG, Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos) grants to the clients of a Spanish financial 
institution or an investing entity the recovery of the credit or the financial instruments they 
had given to the entity, with a maximum of 100.000 per entity and investor.  
Inside the EU, it is required to all the country members to have a system of guarantee fund. 
For all the countries that use the Euro (€), the guarantee limit is 100.000€. With respect to 
the countries that are inside the EU but use their own currency:  
- Iceland: They use the crown of Iceland, the guarantee fund insured up to the amount of 
100.000€ 
- Denmark: They use the Danish Krone, but its deposit guarantee is up to 100.00€. 
- Norway: The guarantee fund is provided by the Guarantee Fund Norwegian banks, it 
covers up to 2 million NOK:  
- Belarus: Deposits are 100% guaranteed in the currency of the account of the client.  
In US the guarantee funds (created before the Spanish FGD) can assure to the investors up 
to 250.000$. In Canada, where the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) was 
created in order to protect the deposits of the investor, they cover C $ 100.000 and only in 
case the savings are in Canadian currency.  
Since 2005, the cover in Japan has increased to ¥ 10 million and nowadays in Hong Kong 
they cover until HK $ 500.000.  
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So, we can extract from this information that the member countries of the EU had reached a 
situation in which all the guarantee funds cover the same maximum amount in case of 
insolvency or bankruptcy. This reinforces the harmonization of the EU and the concerns all of 
the countries have with the protection of the investors. In the US the amount covered is 
higher that in the EU, this could be maybe because the creation of guarantee funds in the US 
is older than in EU, and also because the huge bankruptcy cases that they had suffered.  
When viewing other countries that have not as much reputation in terms of financial 
investing, as the US and the EU, like Hong Kong and Japan, we can see that they have 
recently begun with this system of protection. This could lead us to think that these countries 
know that they are growing, and that people are more interested in investing money in 
shares, projects or investment funds. Also, they are trying to copy the most important 
financial countries in order to become also a huge country. 
The first country that implemented a regulation regarding the insider trading is the US in the 
year 1934, with the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission), as we have been analyzing 
in the first chapter. It is followed by Canada and South Korea, 1966 and 1962 respectively. 
The last country to implement it was Germany in 1994, which has no regulations until 1970 
and since 1970 to 1994 there was only voluntary reporting guidelines. In Australia for 
example, the insider trading was not prohibited since 1970. So, we can find three different 
situations.  
The first one, is the one of the more developed countries (in these years and nowadays), like 
the US and Canada, which were the first to put a regulation regarding the insider trading and 
some penalties and sections to those who practice that. This is because they were huge and 
developed counties in this period and they began to afford these problems earlier than the 
other countries. The second situation we find is the case of Germany. They did not have any 
official regulation regarding the subject sine 1994. This could let us think that in this county 
they were not much concerned about this problem (maybe because they did not find too 
many cases of this practice). And the third case is about Australia, a country that has no 
regulation regarding the insider trading and that in 1970 decides to establish one. The reason 
to that may be that the rest of the wold countries during this period were adopting this 
measure, and in order to arrive to the level of countries such as France, they made a 
regulation.  
As said before, maybe we can find some insider trading in the worst cases of bankruptcy or 
insolvency and this is what had happened in the case of Lehman Brothers. If we search on 
Internet information about the case of Lehman Brothers we can also think several articles 
from the New York Times and the New York Daily News from 2008, regrind this topic. In this 
articles there are brokers that have been sanctioned due to insider trading.  
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6.4.Investor Associations in Spain  41
Minority investors are placed before the majority investors, they have a situation of inferiority. 
Even though Mauro F. Guillén states in his recent paper that “the State should protect 
minority shareholders’ rights as a way to help companies raise capital”,most of the times this 
is not true, and entities are blinded by the money big investors have. This, as we have said 
during all the paper lead them to a prejudicial situation in which they are the most 
disadvantaged.  
One possible solution in order to reduce this disadvantage could be the creation of 
associations for the stock market investor and the public investors in general. These 
associations would not be only used in case of troubles, the investors could use them in 
order to take information when doing a financial operation, or as a shield in case of conflicts. 
Taking into account that there are many types of investors, as we have explained in the 
Section of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), we could differentiate different 
types of investor associations.  
In one hand, shareholder investor associations, which could lead them to a more fluid 
relationship with the society in which they take part of, and thus, they could create an 
association for each company that is in the stock market. On the other hand, general investor 
associations, in which all the investors could take part.  
One of the main functions of this type of associations is the one related with the fluid 
communication between the investors or shareholders and the directives of the society. By 
doing this, the investor will really know the financial situation of the entity, its expectations 
and the strategies followed and thus he/she will take the best operation in a clear way.  
Another important function of this associations is the judicial representation of its shareholder 
and investors in case of conflicts. Once the associations are created, they could bring a huge 
degree of reliability in case he has to act in a judiciary way.  
We can say that the shareholder associations could be the path to follow in order to create a 
fluid communication with the financial entity, and a solid backrest for the investors in case 
they had follow a juridical process. But, can this associations be integrated in some of the 
juridical figures that already exist?  
In first place, it is legally recognized the possibility that investors make a group when 
exercising some of its rights . However, as there is not any relationship among the 42
shareholders that take part in the association (especially when it is a general association), 
this associations could not become an official figure. This is because, the most important for 
 Zunzunegui, F (2005) Hacia el reconocimiento oficial de las asociaciones de accionistas minoritarios, Madrid, 41
ACCIONIS ,Federación Europea de Asociaciones de Accionistas Minoritarios de Bolsa
 This type of rights are called Minority Rights and are the normal individual rights applied to members of a group 42
that share common characteristics. Also, the collective rights accorded to minority groups. Minority rights may 
also apply simply to individual rights of anyone who is not part of a majority decision.
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this associations is arrive to the minimum number of shareholders in order to exercise some 
of its rights, but this would not let them exercise any other function.  
We are talking since the beginning of this paper about the necessity of increasing the 
investor protection. The economic reality that we are living right know (there are many 
minority investors) and the juridic reality (there is a gap in the investor protection), claim for a 
change in order to protect the interest of this investors. Since there are many types of 
investors, it’s important to take into account the necessity of make a juridical framework 
different for each type of investors, personalized, not general.  
The degree of exigency for these associations has to be known by the investors, in order to 
provide them a greater grade of reliability, and thus investors will go to them searching for 
information or help. We have also to keep in mind, that these associations have to be 
controlled, since with its operations could damage the market, but nowadays the figure in 
charge of control this associations does not exist. 
Let’s look more deeply in the functions of the investor associations in order to see if there 
exists any similarity with the processes the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID) has stablished when an investor want to operate in the market.  
Informative function: they are in charge of providing information to the shareholders and to 
the investors. They have to facilitate the access to the information to the shareholders of a 
entity or to the investors in general. This is the reason for why the association has to provide 
information whenever an investor demands it. This function should be complemented also 
with informative campaigns and with the publication of newsletters. Only in case of a huge 
disaster (a global crisis), the association will be demanded to a general informative session 
for all the investors and shareholders.  
But, this function will be different in case of a shareholder association or an investor 
association. The first one, is centered basically in information regarding the entity and its 
position inside the market. The second one, has to inform about the behavior of al the entities 
that are in the market (financial operations, solvency, etc…) and about the evolution of the 
market.  
Defense function: there is any problem for the associations to act in representation of its 
members in a juridical process. Without doubt one of the problems that has to be solved is 
the protection of the shareholders and the investors in case of juridical actions. Nowadays 
this is one of the main motives of the helplessness of the investors, who had to pay the costs 
of the judgements and also carry with the long duration of them and thus, they do not claim 
for the damages.  
We can see, that the informative function is the same as for the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID), the only difference is that with investor associations, investors 
are protected by the association in case of any issue, so they feel more secure; while with 
the MiFID, there is no any legal process entities need to fulfill in case of trouble, each entire 
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should have the Claim department, but the costs of the judicial action (in case it happens) will 
be charged to the client.  
So, investors associations had helped to grew up the grade of confidence investors have in 
the moment of investing. They feel more secure, since there is a entity that will support them. 
7. FINAL CONCLUSIONS
This paper has briefly described how minority investors are protected in different countries 
and if there exists any similarity among them and why their protection is so important. After 
analyzing some of the papers of Randall K. Morck and Mauro F. Guillén we have been able 
to understand its importance. When investors are performing well, the economy of that 
country is also performing well due to the injection of capital to firms. By analyzing the main 
countries worldwide, such as the US, France, Italy and Canada among others, we have 
centered our study in Spain.  
Bankia and Lehman Brothers are two of the most important cases that had proven that the 
methods, the organization, the entities and the figures that are in charge of protecting 
minority investors have still many shortcomings in some of its functions. By looking at these 
cases, we could see that there is a huge number of minority investors who were not well 
informed and mentored when these two crisis happened. But it is also important to keep in 
mind that there was not any financial institution who stopped the processes intimated by both 
entities when they saw it was not correct to did it.  
We have analyzed the insider trading, and there are lots of cases where minority investors 
suffer damages and loses due to this practice. The case of Bankia in Spain is still nowadays 
being studied since there is no explanation of why the authorities had allowed the company 
to made an IPO. Insider trading had favored those who were “lucky” to obtain relevant and 
very important information before the collapse of the shares of Bankia, and those who were 
not so “lucky” are still claiming its money to the entity.  
This is a proof that today we still don’t have any official body in charge of studying those 
cases minutely, nor the Comisión Nacional del Mercdo de Valores (CNMV) or the Bank of 
Spain were alerted about the IPO announced. Besides, the financial entities in charge of 
inform the investors about this IPO were not following to the very detail the steps put by the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), and thus a huge number of minority 
investors were really bad damaged since they put a lot of money into this IPO.  
Lehman Brothers was more affected by insider trading. There are many news regarding this 
topic in which important charges took advantage of confidential information in order to get 
profits. So, its obvious that it is something that is being done wrong. Maybe the financial 
institutions are not doing well its functions, maybe there is lack of awareness of the important 
charges of these two banks, or maybe there is a lack of a institution only regarding this topic.  
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We have analyzed also the main differences and similarities regarding the investor protector 
and the financial institutions in charge of protecting them in different countries. We can 
conclude that there are many differences in how the processes are done, the steps to follow 
and the regulations that rule them, and this leads to different grades of investor protections in 
different countries (as La Porta has analyzed on the 1990s). The main conclusion we can 
extract from this is that, even if there are differences that are mainly due to the different 
cultures and traditions, politics and the financial situation that prevails in every country,  all 
the countries analyzed had similar official bodies in charge of similar functions, even if the 
named them differently. So, we can say that we are in a global process of encouraging 
investor protection, but separately done by every country. But we should take into account, 
as Mauro F. Guillén states in its paper  that “When all countries adopt similar institutional 
structures, they are affected by problems in the same way, making it harder for each of them 
to find a way out of the problem”(Guillén 2016). So, maybe this little differences (or huge in 
some cases) are necessary in order to continue improving and to solve problems, otherwise 
we will be probably stagnated.  
More focused in Spain, we have studied the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID), how it works and the functions it has. We can say that this regulation which tries to 
prevent minority investors from doing operations beyond their capabilities. The MiFID obliges 
all financial institutions to follow successive steps in order to inform, help and orientate the 
investor when doing an operation. However, we can say that there is still something wrong 
done, since we see every day people losing more money they have, or cases such Bankia.  
The figure of investors protector in Spain had been (and still be) a body in which investors 
could claim in case of any trouble. Since its beginnings in 1991 and Manuel Pizarro as the 
investor protector, the functions and performances of that figure had not been changed. This 
is a proof that the figure is still performing well in a world of new technologies and changing 
policies. We have analyzed how the number of claims has evolved during the years, and we 
can conclude that over the years, the investor is more concerned about the operations he/
she wants to do, so there is a fall in the cases performed by the investor protector. Also, we 
have seen that the number of consultations grew over the years, and thanks to this 
consultation the number of cases diminished.  
We can conclude that there are not many differences in the functions and regulations 
followed by the figure of the Investor Protector in the different Stock Markets in Spain 
(Barcelona, Madrid, Bilbao, Valencia). But, we do not have a unique figure in charge of all the 
claims in Spain. We have arrived to the conclusion that it is because it would be very difficult 
for only one person to manage the claims of the users of four different stock markets. It is 
true that there are no huge differences among the functions of this figure, but there are 
differences between the stock markets. So, a figure in every stock market can be more 
precise and efficient in case of some claim. Imagine the difficulty for one person to know all 
the regulations and processes of each stock market and then apply them to every single 
claim case. This will be slow and inefficient.  
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Another point analyzed in this paper, are the guarantee funds. This founds are very related 
with the issue of investor protections, since they are the ones that could return the money 
loser by the investors in some operations, in case the entities had gone to bankruptcy or 
insolvency processes. We have seen that the implementation of this kind of funds is very 
different in every country and we can conclude that the degree of development of each 
country, which is very linked to the degree of economic development, had lead to some 
countries to start these kind of funds earlier than others. Very related to the guarantee funds, 
the investor associations are kind of entities created in order to help and inform investors in 
case of any trouble.  We can conclude that these two entities had increment the grade of 
reliability investors have when operating, since they know that there is someone supporting 
them behind in case of any issue.  
By taking a look at our own experience when doing this research, we can conclude that all 
these financial bodies in charge of protecting the investor and give them all the necessary 
information in case they demand it, do not work very well. After trying to communicate with 
them in order to request for information, only two of the financial institutions answered our 
emails.  
Finally, we can ask ourselves if all these financial institutions are truly indispensable or if we 
can return to the times of the Glass Steagall Act and organize our society differently. Maybe, 
by applying the Glass Steagall Act, we could have avoided the Bankia case, since the 
minority investors had not put their savings into the IPO. The figure of the investor protector 
will be maybe reduced to only one person, since there will be less claims. All the financial 
institutions will be regulated by only one single rule and thus, no confusions nor 
misspecification will be made.   
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Fig. 1 Who controls the world’s great corporations?
Sources: La Porta et al. (1999) with Japanese data augmented by Morck and Nakamura
(1999) to account for combined keiretsu stakes and German data augmented with informa-
tion from Baums (1995) to account for bank proxy voting.
Notes: Fraction of top ten firms with diﬀerent types of controlling shareholders is shown for
each country. Control is assumed if any shareholder or group of shareholders believed to work
in consort controls 20 percent of the votes in a company’s annual shareholder meeting.
Figure 1. Who controls de world’s great corporations? The Global History of 
Corporate Governance. An introduction. K. Morck
Source: Morck R. & Steier Ll. (2005) “The Global History of Corporate Governance An Introduction” in Morck 
ed.: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional 
Managers,National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. University of Chicago Press: pp.1-59. 
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Source: Cameron, L (2007) Investor Protection and the New Zealand Stock Market. New Zealand Treasury, New Zeland, 
Policy Perspectives Paper 07/02 
Figure 3: La Porta’s public protection index: OECD Countries (2000)
Figure 2: La Porta’s private protection index: OECD Countries (2003)
Source: Cameron, L (2007) Investor Protection and the New Zealand Stock Market. New Zealand Treasury, 
New Zeland, Policy Perspectives Paper 07/02 
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Figure 4: World Bank Group, Doing business Protecting Minority Investors, How well 
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se toman las medidas necesarias para que sea co-
rregida. Por otra parte, si se advierten indicios de 
conducta sancionables la CNMV aborda las actua-
ciones supervisoras que resulten necesarias.
En cuanto al alcance del Servicio de Reclama-
ciones, debe tenerse en cuenta que la CNMV no 
puede otorgar indemnizaciones ni reconocer las 
pretensiones económicas de los reclamantes, ya 
que los resarcimientos como consecuencia de 
relaciones mercantiles privadas deben ser estable-
cidos por los tribunales de justicia.
Las reclamaciones más frecuentes están relacio-
nadas con la actuación de los intermediarios del 
mercado, con materias relativas a las sociedades 
cotizadas y a las emisoras de valores, con asuntos 
relacionados con Instituciones de Inversión Colec-
tiva y con entidades no registradas en la CNMV (los 
llamados chiringuitos ﬁ nancieros).
En el año 2008 la CNMV recibió un total de 1.058 
reclamaciones. Un 92% de las mismas iban diri-
gidas contra actuaciones de entidades de crédito. 
Se resolvieron 610. Se dictaron 176 informes favo-
rables al reclamante y 382 desfavorables. 
EL SERVICIO DE 
RECLAMACIONES DEL BANCO 
DE ESPAÑA
Este Servicio también tiene una trayectoria de más 
de 20 años. Su misión es resolver las quejas, re-
clamaciones y consultas que los usuarios de las 
entidades supervisadas por el Banco de España, 
presentan sobre temas relacionados con servicios 
o productos bancarios. En el año 2007 (último 
ejercicio completo del que se jha publicado Me-
moria) se tramitaron 5.736 reclamaciones, 1.679 
consultas telemáticas y 14.400 consultas telefóni-
cas. Es un servicio independiente e imparcial, que 
no toma parte ni por los consumidores ni por las 
entidades. Cuando examina una reclamación soli-
cita información a ambas partes, haciendo un aná-
lisis objetivo e intentando llegar a una resolución 
razonable y justa.
Como en el caso de la CNMV, un requisito pre-
vio antes de presentar una reclamación es acudir 
al Servicio de Atención al Cliente o Defensor del 
Cliente de la entidad.
El tiempo de resolución de la reclamación puede 
variar, en función de la carga de trabajo y de la com-
plejidad del asunto, si bien se sitúa en torno a los 
seis meses aproximadamente.
Los informes que emite el Servicio de Reclamacio-
nes no son vinculantes para ninguna de las partes.
En el último Informe trimestral de reclamacio-
nes publicado correspondiente al 4º trimestre de 
2008 se constata un fuerte aumento del número 
de requerimientos. Este aumento está especial-
mente ligado a la crisis ﬁ nanciera actual. Los prin-
cipales motivos de reclamación fueron, como en 
el trimestre anterior, incidencias relacionadas con 
préstamos y créditos (27,5%), con cuentas de aho-
rro y corriente y depósitos a plazo (25,2%) y con 
el uso de tarjetas de crédito y débito (16,8%). Las 
entidades que absorbieron el mayor número de re-
clamaciones fueron los bancos (52,8% del total) y 
las cajas de ahorros (34%). Destacó el incremento 
experimentado por las reclamaciones presentadas 
contra las sucursales en España de entidades de 
crédito extranjeras y contra los establecimientos 
ﬁ nancieros de crédito
EL ESQUEMA ACTUAL DE 
PROTECCIÓN PARA LOS 
INVERSORES
La Ley 44/2002, de 22 de noviembre, de medidas 
de reforma del sistema ﬁ nanciero (Ley Financiera), 
incluyó en su capítulo V una serie de medidas pro-
tectoras de los clientes de servicios ﬁ nancieros. El 
nuevo marco de protección, hoy vigente, quedó 
completado por la Orden ECO/734/2004, de 11 
de marzo, sobre los departamentos y servicios de 
atención al cliente y el defensor del cliente de las 
entidades ﬁ nancieras.
Según esta normativa legal, las entidades ﬁ nan-
cieras tienen la obligación, de atender y resolver 
las quejas y reclamaciones que sus clientes pue-
dan presentar. Para ello las entidades de crédito, 
empresas de servicios de inversión y entidades 
aseguradoras deben contar con un departamento 
o servicio de atención al cliente. Además pueden 
designar un defensor del cliente, que atienda las 
reclamaciones que determine en cada caso su re-
glamento. El artículo 48 de la Ley de Instituciones 
de Inversión Colectiva extiende este mismo trata-
miento a las sociedades gestoras de instituciones 
de inversión colectiva.
Una vez formulada la queja, si ésta no se hubiese 
resuelto o se hubiese denegado, los encargados 
de atenderla son los Comisionados para la De-
fensa de los Clientes de Servicios Financieros, 
en cuyo Reglamento, aprobado por Real Decreto 
303/2004, de 20 de febrero, se establecen que 
tendrán por objeto la protección de los usuarios 
de servicios ﬁ nancieros. Los Comisionados son 
órganos competentes para atender las que-
jas que formulen los usuarios de los servicios 
prestados por las entidades de crédito, por las 
sociedades de tasación, por los establecimien-
tos de cambio de moneda; por las empresas de 
servicios de inversión y las sociedades gestoras 
RECLAMACIONES RESUELTAS POR EL PROTECTOR DEL INVERSOR DE LA 
BOLSA DE MADRID (TOTAL 1992-2008)
GRÁFICO
<3>
Informes finales/ Favorables
439
39%
Informes finales/ Desfavorables
177
16%
Acuerdos
504
45%
La legislación relativa a la protección del inversor espe-
cífica para los mercados de valores ha experimentado un notable desarrollo 
con el impulso de creación del espacio único europeo. Especialmente aque-
lla que, de forma indirecta, protege los intereses de los inversores forzando 
a emisores e intermediarios a cumplir con determinadas prácticas
Figure 5: Interventions of the Madrid Investor Protector during 1992-2008, claims 
solved 
Source: World Bank Group. (2014). Doing Business. Protecting Minority Investors. Recovered from  http://
www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/protecting-minority-investors (Access date: 18/04/2016) 
Source: Fernández, C. (2009). “El Protector del Inversor de la Bolsa: Origen, principios inspiradores, funciones 
y procedimiento de una institución a la que José Manuel Núñez-Lagos dotó de una estructura de 
funcionamiento pionera.” R vista Bolsa: A Fondo Tercer Trimestre 2009, 36-39 
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Table 1 - What do the protecting minority investors indicators measure?
Source: World Bank Group. (2014). Doing Business. Protecting Minority Investors. Recovered from  http://
www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/protecting-minority-investors (Access date: 18/04/2016) 
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MiFID I MiFID II
EQUITIES OTHER PRODUCTS
EQUITY-
LIKE 
PRODUCTS
FIXED 
INCOME
COMMODIT
IES / 
ENERGY
STRUCTUR
ED 
PRODUCTS
DERIVATIV
ES
Best Execution Greater formalization expected/applied for quote-driven and OTC markets
Reporting to clients Greater formalization expected for all investors (not just retail-classified)
Complex product focus 
Treatment of inducements Extends to other asset classes (revision of independent advice)
Requirements on 
marketing and sales 
material
Extends consistently to cover other asset classes (complex products)
Suitability and 
appropriateness tests Extents consistently to other asset classes
Table 2 : Main differences between MiFID I and MiFID II
Source: Own elaboration 
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Oﬁ cina   del   Protector del Inversor lo precisa 
para aclarar extremos insuﬁ cientemente expli-
cados.
b) Traslado de la documentación enviada por el 
interesado a la entidad o entidades afectadas, 
con el ﬁ n de que remitan sus alegaciones.
c) Comunicación al reclamante de estas con-
testaciones de la entidad afectada, si de ellas 
se deducen elementos de juicio convenien-
tes para el curso del procedimiento.  Nuevas 
alegaciones de las partes. Esta segunda fase 
es un trámite condicionado a su oportunidad. 
En cualquier momento, antes de la redacción 
del informe, los interesados pueden presentar 
nuevas alegaciones.
El Protector podrá solicitar la asistencia de los De-
partamentos de la Bolsa de Madrid y Sociedad de 
Bolsas en demanda de datos.
EL INFORME FINAL.
El Informe ﬁ nal pone término al procedimiento y 
consta de tres partes: antecedentes, fundamentos 
y conclusiones.
En los antecedentes se relacionan los hechos y 
manifestaciones de las partes, y en los fundamen-
tos, se caliﬁ can para la elaboración de las conclu-
siones.
En el Informe se tiene en cuenta, en primer térmi-
no, el contrato de gestión de órdenes bursátiles 
que constituye el soporte, la esencia jurídica de 
esta relación bursátil y sus variantes. Se ha deno-
minado gestión de órdenes bursátiles, cuando el 
inversor se reserva la decisión y redacción de la 
orden y se trata únicamente de su ejecución. Es 
distinta del contrato de gestión de cartera, eviden-
temente, cuando el interesado otorga un mandato 
genérico y el gestor toma las decisiones.
Se aplica la legislación común, la legislación es-
pecial del mercado de valores y la regulación es-
pecíﬁ ca constituida por Circulares e Instrucciones 
Operativas. En este grupo de normas ocupan un 
lugar preferente los Códigos y Reglamentos de 
Conducta.
Finalmente, el Informe también tiene en cuen-
ta, cuando existen, los usos bursátiles, prácticas 
habituales y reglas de comportamiento recíproco 
observadas por las partes, como modo de cursar 
las órdenes, sistema de comunicación de las ope-
raciones efectuadas, relaciones contables, descu-
biertos, etc.
En las conclusiones se propone una solución ple-
namente cifrada.
Hay que poner de maniﬁ esto que la automatiza-
ción e informatización del mercado y de las rela-
ciones intermediario-cliente constituyen una gran 
ayuda, por el apoyo que dan a la seguridad y prue-
ba de los hechos con independencia de las mani-
festaciones de los contendientes. Los servicios de 
información bursátil registran y conservan todos 
los datos de las operaciones.
Los Informes, han tenido una aceptación prác-
ticamente total por las entidades reclamadas, 
aunque no tienen fuerza de obligar. En esto 
reside su grandeza y su servidumbre. Aspiran 
a persuadir, no tienen más valor que su propio 
peso, el rigor de sus fuentes de conocimiento y 
sus métodos de elaboración, la posible solidez 
de sus argumentos, su capacidad para transmitir 
convicciones y la eventual calidad de sus con-
clusiones.
Los Informes también han sugerido innovaciones 
que pueden contribuir al perfeccionamiento de las 
funciones bursátiles. Han sido alegados por las 
partes ante la jurisdicción ordinaria o la CNMV. 
2.A.- RECLAMACIONES (NÚMERO)
INFORMES 
FINALES/ 
FAVORABLES
INFORMES 
FINALES/ 
DESFAVORABLES ACUERDOS
CONSULTAS 
CONTENCIOSAS
NO 
COMPETENTES DESISTIMIENTOS PENDIENTES TOTALES
1992 42 14 40 53 8 5 162
1993 33 30 41 78 3 16 201
1994 10 20 42 75 1 148
1995 10 10 51 10 5 6 92
1996 13 9 7 50 20 3 9 111
1997 20 28 49 68 30 3 24 222
1998 27 14 58 97 37 4 10 247
1999 44 3 98 93 33 7 26 304
2000 55 3 116 68 50 11 38 341
2001 166 45 27 44 43 4 4 333
2002 3 2 8 26 31 3 73
2003 2 2 21 21 26 3 4 79
2004 4 4 19 12 1 2 42
2005 6 2 5 15 26 1 55
2006 1 4 18 10 3 36
2007 3 1 5 7 11 2 2 31
2008 4 9 10 7 1 1 32
TOTAL 439 177 504 780 399 57  2.356
2.B.- RECLAMACIONES (PORCENTAJE)
INFORMES 
FINALES/ 
FAVORABLES
INFORMES 
FINALES/ 
DESFAVORABLES ACUERDOS
CONSULTAS 
CONTENCIOSAS
NO 
COMPETENTES DESISTIMIENTOS PENDIENTES TOTALES
1992 26 9 0 25 33 5 3 100
1993 16 15 20 39 0 1 8 100
1994 7 14 28 51 0 1 0 100
1995 11 0 11 56 11 5 6 100
1996 12 8 6 45 18 3 8 100
1997 9 13 22 31 14 1 11 100
1998 11 6 23 39 15 2 4 100
1999 14 1 32 31 11 2 9 100
2000 16 1 34 20 15 3 11 100
2001 50 14 8 13 13 1 1 100
2002 4 3 11 36 42 0 4 100
2003 3 2 28 27 32 4 5 100
2004 10 0 10 45 29 2 5 100
2005 11 4 9 27 47 2 0 100
2006 3 0 11 50 28 0 8 100
2007 10 3 16 23 35 6 6 100
2008 0 13 28 31 22 3 3 100
TOTAL 19 8 21 33 17 2   
Table 3: Interventions of the Madrid Investor Protector during 1992-2008, claims. 
Source: Fernández, C. (2009). “El Protector del Inversor de la Bolsa: Origen, principios inspiradores, funciones y 
procedimiento de una institución a la que José Manuel Núñez-Lagos dotó de una estructura de funcionamiento 
pionera.” Revista Bolsa: A Fondo Tercer Trimestre 2009, 36-39 
